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Abstract
This paper develops the theory of mechanism redesign by which an auctioneer can reoptimize
an auction based on bid data collected from previous iterations of the auction on bidders from
the same market. We give a direct method for estimation of the revenue of a counterfactual
auction from the bids in the current auction. The estimator is a simple weighted order statistic
of the bids and has the optimal error rate. Two applications of our estimator are A/B testing
(a.k.a., randomized controlled trials) and instrumented optimization (i.e., revenue optimization
subject to being able to do accurate inference of any counterfactual auction revenue).
1 Introduction
This paper develops data-driven methods that enable a principal to adjust the parameters of an
auction so as to optimize its performance, i.e., for mechanism redesign. These methods are especially
relevant to the design of electronic markets such as online advertising, hotel booking platforms,
online auctions, etc.1 For a paradigmatic family of auctions, we derive counterfactual estimators
for the revenue and welfare of one auction in the family from equilibrium bids in another. One
application for these estimators is a framework for A/B testing of auctions, a.k.a., randomized
controlled trials, wherein an auctioneer can compare the revenue of auctions A and B. Another
application is in instrumented optimization where we identify sufficient properties of an auction
so that the revenue of any counterfactual auction can be estimated from equilibrium bids of the
former; we then optimize revenue over auctions with these properties.
Our main technical contribution is a method for counterfactual revenue estimation: given two
auctions we define an estimator for the equilibrium revenue of one from equilibrium bids of the other.
Our estimator has a number of appealing properties that contrast with the standard econometric
approach to inference in auctions. In the standard approach, first the value distribution is inferred
from bids of the first auction using equilibrium analysis, and then the estimated value distribution
is used to calculate the expected equilibrium revenue of the second auction. To infer the value
distribution, the standard approach employs estimates of the derivative of the bid function via an
estimator that typically must be tuned to trade-off bias and variance using assumptions on the bid
distribution. In contrast, our method estimates revenue directly from the bids and our estimator
∗This paper combines and improves upon results from manuscripts Mechanism Design for Data Science (2014)
and A/B Testing of Auctions (2016).
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1We have had extensive discussions over the last decade with R&D teams at companies in this space, especially
Microsoft, which brought us to the model and questions studied in this paper.
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requires no distribution dependent tuning. Our method is statistically efficient with estimation
error proportional to one over the square root of the number of observed bids.
Our work applies to first-price and all-pay position auctions, a model popularized by studies of
auctions for advertising on Internet search engines (cf. Varian, 2007, and Edelman et al., 2007).2
A position auction is defined by a decreasing sequence of weights which correspond to allocation
probabilities, bidders are assigned to weights assortatively by bid, and pay their bid if allocated
(first-price) or always (all-pay). The configurable parameters in this family of auctions are the
weights of the positions. Note that classical revenue optimization in auctions, e.g., by reserve
prices and ironing (Myerson, 1981), is at odds with classical structural inference. Reserve pricing
and ironing pool bidders with distinct values and, thereafter, no procedure for structural inference
can distinguish them. The position auctions (with neither ironing nor reserve prices) of our study
do not exhibit this stark behavior.
Given two position auctions B and C, each defined by positions weights, and N samples from
the Bayes-Nash equilibrium bid distribution from C, our estimator for the Bayes-Nash equilibrium
revenue of B is a weighted order statistic. We apply a formula to the position weights in B and C
to get a weight for each order statistic of the N bids, and then the estimator is the weighted sum
of the order statistics. The error bounds for this estimator are proportional to
√
1/N and a term
derived from the position weights of B and C.
The first application of our revenue estimator is to A/B testing of auctions (see Section 5).
A/B testing, otherwise known as randomized controlled trials, is an industry standard method for
evaluating, tuning, and optimizing Internet services and e-commerce systems (e.g., Kohavi et al.,
2009). This form of online experimentation is happening all the time and the participants of the
experiments are almost always unaware that the experiment is being conducted. Our framework
for A/B testing of auctions is motivated – as we describe subsequently – by auction environments
where ideal A/B testing is impossible.3 In our framework bidders bid first and then the experimenter
randomly selects and runs control auction A or treatment auction B on the bids. Importantly, the
bidders are unaware of whether they are in the control A or treatment B, but have instead bid
according to the Bayes-Nash equilibrium of auction C, the convex combination of auctions A and
B. Our task of A/B testing of auctions is then to calculate and compare estimates of the revenues
of A and B given bids in C. Note, a convex combination of position auctions is a position auction
with position weights given by the convex combination. Suppose the A/B test auction C runs the
control auction A with probability 1−  and the treatment auction B with probability . Our main
result for A/B testing is that the revenue from B can be estimated from bids in C with error that
depends on  as log(1/). This error bound improves exponentially over the
√
1/ dependence on
 that would be obtained by ideal A/B testing.
The second application of our revenue estimator is to instrumented optimization (see Section 6).
The error in our revenue estimate for auction B from the bids in auction C depends on the allocation
rule for auction C. (It depends, in particular, on a relationship between the position weights in B
and C; for example, in the A/B testing application, above, the position weights are related by .)
Our first result shows that there is universal treatment B such that in the A/B test mechanism C,
the revenue of any other position auction can be estimated. A solution, then, to the instrumented
2First-price and all-pay position auctions generalize classical single-item and multi-unit auction models and are
an important form of auction for theoretical study, see e.g., Chawla and Hartline (2013) and Hartline and Taggart
(2016). Unfortunately, our methods cannot be directly applied to position auctions with the so-called “generalized
second price” payment rule of Google’s AdWords platform.
3In ideal A/B testing, the bids in A and B are respectively in equilibrium for A and B.
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optimization problem is to run the A/B test mechanism C that corresponds to the revenue optimal
position auction A and this universal treatment B. Our second result incorporates a bound on the
desired rate of estimation into the revenue optimization problem and derives the revenue optimal
auction subject to good revenue inference. Our analysis gives a tradeoff between revenue bounds
(relative to the optimal position auction) and the desired rate of inference. Finally, we show that
the revenue optimal position auction (without reserve prices or ironing) approximates the revenue
optimal auction (with reserve prices and ironing); thus, there is little loss in revenue from restricting
to the family of position auctions for which our inference methods are applicable.
Our bounds on the error of our estimator are expressed in terms of the the number of samples
(from the bid distribution, subsequently denoted by N) and the number of bidders (in each auction,
subsequently denoted by n). A straightforward econometric analysis might treat the number of
bidders in each auction as a constant; consequently, the bounds from such an analysis would not
preclude the possibility that there is a very large error until the number of samples is exponentially
larger than this number of bidders. Such an error bound would have no practical significance as,
for auctions with ten or more bidders, the number of samples required for convergence to the limit
behavior could be more than the number of people on the planet. Though their proofs are more
complex, in contrast, our bounds show that the dependence on the number of bidders is modest.
While much of this paper focuses on estimating and optimizing revenue, in Section 7 we extend
the method to the estimation of social welfare.
1.1 Motivating Example: Auctions for Internet Search Advertising.
Our work is motivated by the auctions that sell advertisements on Internet search engines (see
historical discussion by Fain and Pedersen, 2006). The first-price position auction we study in this
paper was introduced in 1998 by the Internet listing company GoTo. This auction was adapted
by Google in 2002 for their AdWords platform, modified to have a second-price-like payment rule,
and is known as the generalized second-price auction. Early theoretical studies of equilibrium in
the generalized second-price auction were conducted by Varian (2007) and Edelman et al. (2007);
unlike the second-price auction for which it is named, the generalized second-price auction does not
admit a truthtelling equilibrium.
Internet search advertising works as follows. A user looking for web pages on a given topic
specifies keywords on which to search. The search engine then returns a listing of web pages
that relate to these keywords. Alongside these search results, the search engine displays sponsored
results. These results are conventionally explicitly labeled as sponsored and appear in the mainline,
i.e., above the search results, or in the sidebar, i.e., to the right of the search results. The mainline
typically contains up to four ads and the sidebar contains up to seven ads. The order of the ads
is of importance as the Internet user is more likely to read and click on ads in higher positions on
the page. In the classic model of Varian (2007) and Edelman et al. (2007) the user’s click behavior
is exogenously given by weights associated with the positions,4 and the weights are decreasing in
position. An advertiser only pays for the ad if the user clicks on it. Thus in the classic first-price
position auction, advertisers are assigned to positions in order of their bids, and the advertisers on
whose ads the user clicks each pay their bids.
As described above, the ads in the mainline have higher click rates than those in the sidebar. The
4Endogenous click models have also been considered, e.g., Athey and Ellison (2011), but are less prevalent in the
literature.
3
mainline, however, is not required to be filled to capacity (a maximum of four ads). In the first-price
position auction described above, the choice of the number of ads to show in the mainline affects the
revenue of the auction and, in the standard auction-theoretic model of Bayes-Nash equilibrium, this
choice is ambiguous with respect to revenue ranking. For some distributions of advertiser values,
showing more ads in the mainline gives more revenue, while for other distributions fewer ads gives
more revenue.
The keywords of the user enable the advertisers to target users with distinct interests. For
example, hotels in Hawaii may wish to show ads to a user searching for “best beaches,” while a
computer hardware company would prefer users searching for “laptop reviews.” Thus, the search
advertising is in fact a collection of many partially overlapping markets, with some high-volume
high-demand keywords and a long tail of niche keywords. The conditions of each of these markets
are distinct and thus, as per the discussion of the preceding paragraph, the number of ads to show
in the mainline depends on the keywords of the search.
One empirical method for evaluating two alternatives, e.g., showing one or two mainline ads, is
A/B testing.In the ideal setting of A/B testing, the auctions for a given keyword would be randomly
divided into the A and B groups. In part A the advertisers would bid in Bayes-Nash equilibrium for
A and in part B they would bid in equilibrium for B. Unfortunately, because we need to test both
A and B in each market, ideal A/B testing would require soliciting distinct bids for each variant of
the auction. This approach is impractical, both from an engineering perspective and from a public
relations perspective. In practice, A/B tests are run on these ad platforms all the time and without
informing the advertisers. Of course, advertisers can observe any overall change in the mechanism
and adapt their bids accordingly, i.e., they can be assumed to be in equilibrium. Our approach of
A/B testing, where bids are in equilibrium for auction C, the convex combination of A and B, is
consistent with the industry standard practice for Internet search advertising.
Our A/B testing framework is motivated specifically by the goal of optimizing an auction to
local characteristics of the market in which the auction is run. It is important to distinguish this
goal from that of another framework for A/B testing which is commonly used to evaluate global
properties of auctions across a collection of disjoint markets. This framework randomly partitions
the individual markets into a control group (where auction A is run) and a treatment group (with
auction B). From such an A/B test we can evaluate whether it is better for all markets to run
A or for all to run B. It cannot be used, however, for our motivating application of determining
the number of mainline ads to show, where the optimal number naturally varies across distinct
markets. The work of Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2011) on reserve pricing in Yahoo!’s ad auction
demonstrates how such a global A/B test can be valuable. They first used a parametric estimator
for the value distribution in each market to determine a good reserve price for that market. Then
they did a global A/B test to determine whether the auction with their calculated reserve prices
(the B mechanism) has higher revenue on average than the auction with the original reserve prices
(the A mechanism). Our methods relate to and can replace the first step of their analysis.
1.2 Related Work
Our work is motivated, in part, by field work in the past decade that considers the empirical opti-
mization of reserve prices in auctions (e.g., Reiley, 2006; Brown and Morgan, 2009; and Ostrovsky
and Schwarz, 2011). The field study of Ostrovsky and Schwarz is most similar to our theoretical
study and the motivating example of Section 1.1. They consider the generalized second-price po-
sition auction of Internet search advertising (on Yahoo!). They assume that the distribution of
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advertiser (bidder) values is lognormal and use structural inference to estimate the parameters of
the distribution for the keywords of each search. This allows for inference of the optimal reserve
price. They then suggest using a reserve price that is slightly smaller. Finally, they evaluate the
method of setting reserves via a global A/B test that compairs the original reserves with their
reserves across all keywords. While the authors motivate the usage of reserves slightly smaller
than the optimal reserves for reasons of robustness, in the context of our motivation these smaller
reserves also allow future inference around the optimal reserve price where the optimal reserves do
not.
The classical approach to counterfactual inference is based on recovering the values of bidders
by inverting their best responses using the empirical distribution of bids. This approach was
developed by Guerre et al. (2000) for single-unit first-price auctions and it has seen application
broadly in auction theory (e.g. see Athey and Haile, 2007, and Paarsch and Hong, 2006). This
classical method of counterfactual estimation requires an estimator for the derivative of the bid
distribution. In contrast, our approach directly estimates revenue without explicitly infering the
values of bidders. Our inference method is based on a technique similar to that in Myerson (1981)
that “integrates out” best responses of agents so that the auction revenue can be expressed directly
in terms of the observable bids.
Our estimator of the counterfactual auction revenue is simply a weighted order statistic of
samples from the bid distribution. Other works have proposed using similarly simple estimators to
obtain bounds on the performance a counterfactual auctions. Unlike our work, these estimators do
not use the first-order condition of Bayes-Nash equilbrium, but in exchange for a weakening of the
assumptions of the model, they obtain bounds instead of point estimates. For example, Coey et al.
(2014) consider ascending single-item auctions and use the main theorem of Bulow and Klemperer
(1996), the revenue submodularity of Dughmi et al. (2012), and the expected second- and third-
highest bids to bound the revenue of the (counterfactual) optimal auction. See their related work
section for a discussion of similar studies.
The mechanism design literature has previously considered the problem of an uninformed de-
signer who wishes optimize a mechanism under three conditions: (a) repeatedly on agents from
the same population (each agent participates only once; see Kleinberg and Leighton, 2003; Blum
and Hartline, 2005; and Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2015), (b) with samples from the value distribution
(see Cole and Roughgarden, 2014, and Fu et al., 2014), and (c) on the fly in one mechanism (see
Goldberg et al., 2006; Segal, 2003; and Baliga and Vohra, 2003). These works exclusively consider
mechanisms that have truthtelling equilibria and for which, consequently, inference is trivial. The
papers listed in category (a) also consider a model where the designer only learns the revenue of
the mechanism in each round and not the individual bids. These papers adapt methods from the
multi-armed bandit literature, e.g., Auer et al. (2002), which tradeoff exploring the performance of
mechanisms that the designer is less informed about with exploiting the mechanisms which have
been learned to perform well. Our approach of instrumented optimization is similar to the ex-
ploration steps of these multi-armed bandit algorithms, except that we assume that bids are in
equilibrium for the distribution over mechanisms rather than for each individual mechanism. This
distinction is important for mechanisms that do not have truthtelling equilibria.
Finally, the theory that we develop for optimizing revenue over the class of rank-by-bid position
auctions is isomorphic to the theory of envy-free optimal pricing developed by Devanur et al.
(2015).
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Auction Theory
A standard auction design problem is defined by a set [n] = {1, . . . , n} of n ≥ 2 agents, each with a
private value vi for receiving a service. The values are bounded as vi ∈ [0, 1] and are independently
and identically distributed according to a continuous distribution F . If xi indicates the probability
of service and pi the expected payment required, agent i has linear utility ui = vixi − pi. An
auction elicits bids b = (b1, . . . , bn) from the agents and maps the vector b of bids to an allocation
x˜(b) = (x˜1(b), . . . , x˜n(b)), specifying the probability with which each agent is served, and prices
p˜(b) = (p˜1(b), . . . , p˜n(b)), specifying the expected amount that each agent is required to pay. An
auction is denoted by (x˜, p˜).
Standard payment formats In this paper we study two standard payment formats. In a first-
price format, each agent pays his bid upon winning, that is, p˜i(b) = bi x˜i(b). In an all-pay format,
each agent pays his bid regardless of whether or not he wins, that is, p˜i(b) = bi.
Bayes-Nash equilibrium The values are independently and identically distributed according
to a continuous distribution F . This distribution is common knowledge to the agents. A strategy
si for agent i is a function that maps the value of the agent to a bid. The distribution of values
F and a profile of strategies s = (s1, · · · , sn) induces interim allocation and payment rules (as a
function of bids) as follows for agent i with bid bi.
x˜i(bi) = Ev−i∼F [x˜i(bi, s−i(v−i))] and
p˜i(bi) = Ev−i∼F [p˜i(bi, s−i(v−i))] .
Agents have linear utility which can be expressed in the interm as:
u˜i(vi, bi) = vix˜i(bi)− p˜i(bi).
The strategy profile forms a Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE) if for all agents i, values vi, and al-
ternative bids bi, bidding si(vi) according to the strategy profile is at least as good as bidding bi.
I.e.,
u˜i(vi, si(vi)) ≥ u˜i(vi, bi). (1)
A symmetric equilibrium is one where all agents bid by the same strategy, i.e., s statisfies si = s
for all i and some s. For a symmetric equilibrium of a symmetric auction, the interim allocation
and payment rules are also symmetric, i.e., x˜i = x˜ and si = s for all i. For implicit distribution
F and symmetric equilibrium given by stratey s, a mechanism can be described by the pair (x˜, p˜).
Chawla and Hartline (2013) show that the equilibrium of every auction in the class we consider is
unique and symmetric.
The strategy profile allows the mechanism’s outcome rules to be expressed in terms of the
agents’ values instead of their bids; the distribution of values allows them to be expressed in terms
of the agents’ values relative to the distribution. This latter representation exposes the geometry
of the mechanism. Define the quantile q of an agent with value v to be the probability that v is
larger than a random draw from the distribution F , i.e., q = F (v). Denote the agent’s value as a
function of quantile as v(q) = F−1(q), and his bid as a function of quantile as b(q) = s(v(q)). The
outcome rule of the mechanism in quantile space is the pair (x(q), p(q)) = (x˜(b(q)), p˜(b(q))).
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Revenue curves and auction revenue Myerson (1981) characterized Bayes-Nash equilibria
and this characterization enables writing the revenue of a mechanism as a weighted sum of revenues
of single-agent posted pricings. Formally, the revenue curve R(q) for a given value distribution
specifies the revenue of the single-agent mechanism that serves an agent with value drawn from
that distribution if and only if the agent’s quantile exceeds q: R(q) = v(q) (1 − q). Myerson’s
characterization of BNE then implies that the expected revenue of a mechanism at BNE from an
agent facing an allocation rule x(q), notated Px, can be written as follows:
Px = R(0)x(0) + Eq
[
R(q)x′(q)
]
= R(1)x(1)−Eq
[
R′(q)x(q)
]
(2)
where x′ and R′ denote the derivative of x and R with respect to q, respectively. For value
distributions supported on [0, 1], R(0) = R(1) = 0 and the constant terms in equation (2) are
identically zero.
The expected revenue of an auction is the sum over the agents of its per-agent expected revenue;
for auctions with symmetric equilibrium allocation rule x this revenue is nPx.
Position environments and rank-based auctions A position environment expresses the fea-
sibility constraint of the auction designer in terms of position weights w satisfying 1 ≥ w1 ≥ w2 ≥
· · · ≥ wn ≥ 0. A position auction assigns agents (potentially randomly) to positions 1 through n,
and an agent assigned to position i gets allocated with probability wi. The rank-by-bid position
auction orders the agents by their bids, with ties broken randomly, and assigns agent i, with the
ith largest bid, to position i, with allocation probability wi. Multi-unit environments are a special
case and are defined for k units as wj = 1 for j ∈ {1, . . . , k} and wj = 0 for j ∈ {k+ 1, . . . , n}. The
highest-k-bids-win multi-unit auction is the special case of the rank-by-bid position auction for the
k-unit environment.
In our model with agent values drawn i.i.d. from a continuous distribution, rank-by-bid position
auctions with either all-pay or first-price payment semantics have a unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium
and this equilibrium is symmetric and efficient, i.e., in equilibrium, the agents’ bids and values are
in the same order (Chawla and Hartline, 2013).
Rank-by-bid position auctions can be viewed as convex combinations of highest-bids-win multi-
unit auctions. The marginal weights of a position environment are w′ = (w′1, . . . , w′n) with w′k =
wk − wk+1. Define w′0 = 1 − w1 and note that the marginal weights w′ can be interpreted as a
probability distribution over {0, . . . , n}. As rank-by-bid position auctions are efficient, the rank-by-
bid position auction with weights w has the exact same allocation rule as the mechanism that draws
a number of units k from the distribution given by w′ and runs the highest-k-bids-win auction.
Denote the highest-k-bids-win allocation rule as xk:n and its per-agent revenue as Pk = Pxk:n =
Eq[−R′(q)xk:n(q)]. This allocation rule is precisely the probability an agent with quantile q has
one of the highest k quantiles of n agents, or at most k − 1 of the n − 1 remaining agents have
quantiles greater than q. Formulaically,
xk:n(q) =
k−1∑
i=0
(
n−1
i
)
qn−1−i(1− q)i.
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Importantly, the allocation rule (in quantile space) of a rank-by-bid position auction does not
depend on the distribution at all. The allocation rule x of the rank-by-bid position auction with
weights w is:
x(q) =
∑
k
w′k xk:n(q).
By revenue equivalence (Myerson, 1981), the per-agent revenue of the rank-by-bid position auction
with weights w is:
Px =
∑
k
w′k Pk.
Of course, P0 = Pn = 0 as always serving or never serving the agents gives zero revenue.
A rank-based auction is one where the probability that an agent is served is a function only of
the rank of the agent’s bid among the other bids and not the magnitudes of the bids. Any rank-
based auction induces a position environment where w¯k denotes the probability that the agent with
the kth ranked bid is served. This auction is equivalent to the rank-by-bid position auction with
these weights w¯. In a position environment with weights w, the following lemma characterizes the
weights w¯ that are induced by rank-based auctions.
Lemma 2.1 (e.g., Devanur et al., 2013). There is a rank-based auction with induced position
weights w¯ for a position environment with weights w if and only if their cumulative weights satisfy∑k
j=1 w¯j ≤
∑k
j=1wj for all k.
2.2 Inference
As we discussed in the introduction, the traditional structural inference in the auction settings
is based on inferring distribution of values, which is unobserved but can be inferred from the
distribution of bids, which is observed. Once the value distribution is inferred, other properties of
the value distribution such as its corresponding revenue curve, which is fundamental for optimizing
revenue, can be obtained. In this section we briefly overview this approach.
The key idea behind the inference of the value distribution from the bid distribution is that
the strategy which maps values to bids is a best response, by equation (1), to the distribution of
bids. As the distribution of bids is observed, and given suitable continuity assumptions, this best
response function can be inverted.
We assume that the value distribution function F (·), the allocation rule x(·), and consequently
also the quantile function of bid distribution b(·), are monotone, continuously differentiable, and
invertible.
Inference for first-price auctions Consider a first-price rank-based auction with a symmetric
bid function b(q) and allocation rule x(q) in BNE. To invert the bid function we solve for the bid
that the agent with any value would make. Continuity of this bid function implies that its inverse
is well defined. Applying this inverse to the bid distribution gives the value distribution.
The utility of an agent with quantile q as a function of his bid z is
u(q, z) = (v(q)− z)x(b−1(z)). (3)
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Differentiating with respect to z we get:
d
dzu(q, z) = −x(b−1(z)) +
(
v(q)− z)x′(b−1(z)) ddz b−1(z).
Here x′ is the derivative of x with respect to the quantile q. Because b(·) is in BNE, the derivative
d
dzu(q, z) is 0 at z = b(q). Rarranging, we obtain:
v(q) = b(q) + x(q) b
′(q)
x′(q) (4)
Inference for all-pay auctions We repeat the calculation above for rank-based all-pay auctions;
the starting equation (3) is replaced with the analogous equation for all-pay auctions:
u(q, z) = v(q)x(b−1(z))− z. (5)
Differentiating with respect to z we obtain:
d
dzu(q, z) = v(q)x
′(b−1(z))
d
dz
b−1(z)− 1,
Again the first-order condition of BNE implies that this expression is zero at z = b(q); therefore,
v(q) = b
′(q)
x′(q) . (6)
Known and observed quantities Recall that the functions x(q) and x′(q) are known precisely:
these are determined by the rank-based auction definition. The functions b(q) and b′(q) are ob-
served. The calculations above hold in the limit as the number of samples from the bid distribution
goes to infinity, at which point these obserations are precise.
Equations (4) and (6) enable the value function, or equivalently, the value distribution, to be
estimated from the estimated bid function and an estimator for the derivative of the bid function,
or equivalently, the density of the bid distribution. Estimation of densities is standard; however, it
requires assumptions on the distribution, e.g., continuity, and the convergence rates in most cases
will be slower. Our main results do not take this standard approach. Below we discuss errors in
estimation of the bid function.
2.3 Statistical Model and Methods
Our framework for counterfactual auction revenue analysis is based on directly using the distribution
of bids for inference. The main error in estimation of the bid distribution is the sampling error due
to drawing only a finite number of samples from the bid distribution. Evaluation of the auction
revenue requires the knowledge of the quantile function of bid distribution. While estimation of
empirical distributions is standard, quantile functions can be significantly more difficult to estimate
especially if the distribution density can approach zero on its support since the distribution function
is non-invertible at those points. As we show further, estimation of the counterfactual auction
revenues requires the knowledge of the density-weighted quantile function which can be robustly
estimated despite the potential non-invertibility of the distribution function. In this subsection,
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we overview the uniform absolute error bound of the density-weighted quantile function of the bid
distribution of a multi-unit auction based on the results in Cso¨rgo¨ (1983).
The analyst obtains N samples from the bid distribution. Each sample is the corresponding
agent’s best response to the true bid distribution. We can estimate the quantile function of the
equilibrium bid distribution b(q) as follows. Let bˆ1, · · · , bˆN denote the N samples drawn from the
bid distribution. Sort the bids so that bˆ1 ≤ bˆ2 ≤ · · · ≤ bˆN and define the estimated quantile function
of the bid distribution bˆ(·) as
bˆ(q) = bˆi ∀i ∈ N, q ∈ [i− 1, i)/N (7)
Definition 1. For function b(·),estimator bˆ(·) and the weighting function ω(·) ≥ 0, the weighted
uniform mean absolute error is defined as
Ebˆ
[
supq ω(q)
∣∣b(q)− bˆ(q)∣∣] .
The main object that will arise in our subsequent analyses will be the weighted quantile function
of the bid distribution where the weights are determined by the allocation rules of the auctions
under consideration, e.g., Eq[ω(q) b(q)] for some quantile weighting function given by ω(·).5 The
important insight is that while the estimation of the quantile function of the bid distribution bˆ(·)
maybe problematic around the points where the density of the bid distribution is close to zero, the
estimation of the density-weighted quantile function is a lot more robust. As we will show further,
estimation of auction revenues involves such a density-weighted form of the quantile function. Our
error bounds are based on the uniform convergence of quantile processes and weighted quantile
processes in Csorgo and Revesz (1978), Cso¨rgo¨ (1983), and Cheng and Parzen (1997). For the
quantile weighting function ω(q) = 1/b′(q), i.e., the inverse derivative of the bid function, the√
N -normalized mean absolute error is bounded by a universal constant.
Lemma 2.2. Suppose that b and b′ exist on (0, 1) and supq∈(0, 1) q(1 − q)b′(q) < ∞. Then the
density-weighted uniform mean absolute error of the empirical quantile function bˆ(·) on q ∈ [δN , 1−
δN ] with δN =
25 log logN
N is bounded almost surely as
Ebˆ
[
supq∈[δN , 1−δN ]
∣∣√N(b′(q))−1(b(q)− bˆ(q))∣∣] < 1 + 16log logN√
N
sup
q
q(1− q)b′(q).
This result is a consequence of statement (3.2.3) in Theorem 3.2.1 in Cso¨rgo¨ (1983). For all-pay
auctions by equation (6), the term supq{q(1− q)b′(q)} is bounded by 14 supq{x′(q)}. For first-price
auctions by equation (4), it is bounded by supq{q(1− q)x′(q)/x(q)}.
3 Inference methodology and error bounds for all-pay auctions
We will now develop a methodology and error bounds for estimating the revenue of one rank-based
auction using bids from another rank-based auction. There are two advantages of the restriction of
our analysis to rank-based auctions. First, the allocation rule (in quantile space) of a rank-based
auction is independent of the bid and value distribution; therefore, it is known and does not need to
5Estimators of these functions, i.e., replacing the bid distribution with the empirical bid distribution, are called
L-statistics in the statistics literature.
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be estimated. Second, the allocation rules that result from rank-based auctions are well behaved,
in particular their slopes are bounded, and our error analysis makes use of this property.
Recall from Section 2.1 that the revenue of any rank-based auction can be expressed as a linear
combination of the multi-unit revenues P1, . . . , Pn with Pk equal to the per-agent revenue of the
highest-k-bids-win auction. Therefore, in order to estimate the revenue of a rank-based auction, it
suffices to estimate each Pk accurately.
In Section 3.1 we derive the counterfactual revenue estimator. We state and discuss the error
bounds of this estimator in Section 3.2. Two bounds are given; the first bound holds in worst case
over counterfactual and incumbent mechanisms and the second bound depends on the closeness
of the allocation rules of the counterfactual and incumbent mechanisms. The main ideas of the
derivation of the error bounds are given in Section 3.3.
3.1 The revenue estimator
This section derives an estimator for counterfactual revenue of an auction with a given allocation
rule from the bids of an all-pay rank-based auction. The estimator is based on the following two
observations. The first observation is that the revenue equation (2) can be expanded with the
inference equation (6) and integrated by parts to give an equation for counterfactual revenue as a
linear function of the bid function. Our estimator is then a weighted order statistic of the empirical
bid function. The second observation is that truncating the bid distribution at its extremes results
in a tradeoff of the variance of the resulting estimator (which can diverge) with a bias (which is
bounded).
Consider estimating the revenue of an auction with allocation rule y from the bids of an all-
pay rank-based auction. In terms of the revenue curve R(·) or inverse demand function v(·), the
per-agent revenue of the allocation rule y is given by:
Py = Eq
[
y′(q)R(q)
]
= Eq
[
y′(q) v(q) (1− q)] .
Let x denote the allocation rule of the auction that we run, and b denote the bid distribution in BNE
of this auction. Recall that for an all-pay auction format, we can convert the bid distribution into
the value distribution as follows: v(q) = b′(q)/x′(q). Substituting this equation into the expression
for Py above we get
Py = Eq
[
y′(q)(1− q) b
′(q)
x′(q)
]
= Eq
[
Zy(q) b
′(q)
]
(8)
where Zy(q) = (1 − q) y
′(q)
x′(q) . Treating this expectation as an integral and integrating it by parts,
when the constant terms are zero, gives:
Py = Eq
[−Z ′y(q) b(q)] . (9)
The subsequent analysis will include consideration of the constant terms when they are not zero.
The analysis above gives two ways to write counterfactual revenue. Equation (8) writes the
revenue as linear in the derivative of the bid function while equation (9) writes it as linear in the
bid function. We will define our estimator in terms of former for extreme quantiles and in terms
of the latter for moderate quantiles. The reason for this definition is that the latter gives a simple
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and well behaved estimator in terms of the bid function, but might diverge at the extremes;6 while
the former at the extremes introduces only modest bias when approximated by zero.
Lemma 3.1. The per-agent counterfactual revenue of a rank-based auction with allocation rule y
can be expressed in terms of the bid function b of an all-pay mechanism x as:
Py =
contribution from moderate quantiles︷ ︸︸ ︷
Eq 6∈Λ
[−Z ′y(q) b(q)]+ Zy(1− δN ) b(1− δN )− Zy(δN ) b(δN ) + (10)
Eq∈Λ
[
Zy(q) b
′(q)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
contribution from extreme quantiles
where Zy(q) = (1 − q) y
′(q)
x′(q) , extreme quantiles are Λ = [0, δN ] ∪ [1 − δN , 1], and the truncation
parameter is δN ∈ [0, 1/2]. For bid functions that are constant on the extreme quantiles, the
counterfactual revenue can be written as
Py = Eq 6∈Λ
[−Z ′y(q) b(q)]+ Zy(1− δN ) b(1). (11)
In this latter case or when δN = 0, the expressed revenue is linear in the bid function.
Proof. The first part of the lemma follows from plugging the all-pay inference equation (6) into the
revenue equation (2) and integrating by parts on moderate quantiles [δN , 1− δN ]. The second part
of the lemma simplifies the first part using b′(q) = 0 for extremal q ∈ Λ, b(0) = b(δN ) = 0, and
b(1− δN ) = b(1).
This formulation allows the estimation of Py directly as a weighted order statistic of the observed
bids, with b(·) replaced by the estimated bid distribution bˆ(·). Theorem 2.2 tells us that, except at
the extreme quantiles, the estimated bid distribution bˆ(·) closely approximates b(·). At the extreme
quantiles there is a bias-variance tradeoff. The variance from including the contribution to the
revenue from these quantiles in the estimator can greatly exceed the bias from excluding them
entirely. Thus, to prevent the larger error at the extreme quantiles from degrading the accuracy
of the estimator, these estimated bids are rounded down to zero and up to the maximum observed
bid at the low and high extremes, respectively. Recall that the estimated bid distribution bˆ(·)
is defined, in equation (7), as a piecewise constant function with N pieces. Thus, the estimator
Pˆy = Eq[−Z ′y(q) bˆ(q)] can be simplified as expressed in the following definition.
Definition 2. The estimator Pˆy (with truncation parameter δN ) for the revenue of an auction with
allocation rule y from N samples bˆ1 ≤ · · · ≤ bˆN from the equilibrium bid distribution of an all-pay
auction with allocation rule x is:
Pˆy =
N−δNN∑
i=δNN
[(
1− i− 1
N
)
y′( i−1N )
x′( i−1N )
−
(
1− i
N
)
y′( iN )
x′( iN )
]
bˆi + δN
y′(1− δN )
x′(1− δN ) bˆN .
This estimator is a weighted order statistic. Our main theorems set the truncation parameter to
a specific value δN = max(25 log logN,n)/N and show that, with no assumptions on the distribution
6Both Zy(q) = (1− q) y
′(q)
x′(q) and Z
′
y(q) can be infinite at the boundary q ∈ {0, 1} when x and y are polynomials of
different degrees.
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of values or bids, the truncated estimator’s mean absolute error is bounded. Importantly, this
truncated estimator does not have any parameters that need to be tuned to the distribution of bids
or values.
We refer to the estimator with truncation parameter set to zero as the untruncated estimator.
We study the untrucated estimator in simulations in Section 4 and demonstrate that, when Zy(0)
and Zy(1) are small, it can be quite accurate with very few bid samples.
3.2 Error bounds
Our first main result of this section is the following error bound for the estimator of Definition 2.
Theorem 3.2. The mean absolute error in estimating the revenue of a rank-based auction with
allocation rule y using N samples from the bid distribution for an all-pay rank-based auction with
allocation rule x is bounded as below. Here n is the number of positions in the two auctions, and
Pˆy is the estimator in Definition 2 with δN set to max(25 log logN,n)/N .
Ebˆ
[
|Pˆy − Py|
]
≤ 16n
2 logN√
N
.
Observe that the above error bound is independent of the allocation rules x and y. When x
and y are similar to each other, our estimator should in fact achieve a much better error rate than
the one above. For example, when x and y are identical, the error in estimation should have the
same dependence on the number of samples as the statistical error in bids, namely 1/
√
N . Our
next theorem quantifies this relationship.
In order to capture the dependence of our error bounds in estimating Py on the relationship
between the incumbent allocation rule x and the counterfactual allocation rule y, we define a new
quantity, Φx,y, as follows:
Φx,y := sup
q
{y′(q)} max
{
1, log sup
q:y′(q)≥1
x′(q)
y′(q)
, log sup
q
y′(q)
x′(q)
}
. (12)
We then obtain the following theorem for the special case of estimating the multi-unit revenues.
Theorem 3.3. Let x and xk denote the allocation rules for any all-pay rank-based auction and the
k-highest-bids-win auction over n positions, respectively. Let Pˆk denote the estimator from Defini-
tion 2 for estimating the revenue Pk of the latter auction from N samples of the bid distribution
of the former, with δN set to max(25 log logN,n)/N . If δN ≤ 1/n, the mean absolute error of the
estimator Pˆk is bounded as follows.
Ebˆ
[
|Pˆk − Pk|
]
≤ 80√
N
Φx,xk .
We obtain a slightly worse error bound when y is a general rank-based auction:
Corollary 3.4. Let x and y denote the allocation rules for any two all-pay rank-based auctions
over n positions. Let Pˆy denote the estimator from Definition 2 for estimating the revenue of the
latter from N samples of the bid distribution of the former, with δN set to max(25 log logN,n)/N .
If δN ≤ 1/n, the mean absolute error of the estimator Pˆy is bounded as follows.
Ebˆ
[
|Pˆy − Py|
]
≤ 80√
N
n log supq n
y′(q)
x′(q)
.
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We sketch the main ideas of Theorem 3.2 in Section 3.3. The full proof and the refinement
necessary to obtain Theorem 3.3 and Corollary 3.4 are given in Appendix A.
From Theorem 3.3, the error in the estimator depends on the slopes of the allocation rules x and
y. The maximum slope of the multi-unit allocation rules, and therefore also that of any rank-based
auction, is always bounded by n, the number of agents in the auction (summarized as Fact 3.5,
below).
Fact 3.5. The maximum slope of the allocation rule x of any n-agent rank-based auction is bounded
by n: supq x
′(q) ≤ n. More specifically, the maximum slope of the allocation rule xk for the n-agent
highest-k-bids-win auction is bounded by
sup
q
x′k(q) ∈
[
1√
2pi
,
1√
pi
]
n− 1√
min{k − 1, n− k} = Θ
(
n√
min{k, n− k}
)
.
We evaluate the error bound given by Theorem 3.3 for a few special cases of x and xk. For
simplicity in applying Fact 3.5, we assume k < n/2.
• When x = xk, Φx,xk ≤ n/
√
k and we get an error bound of 80 n√
Nk
, which is the same (within
a constant factor) as the statistical error in bids.
• The bound in the previous case degrades smoothly when x and xk are close but not identical,
as in x′k ≤ x′ ≤ x′k/ for  > 0. We have Φx,xk ≤ log(1/)n/
√
k and the error bound is:
80 log(1/) n√
Nk
.
• Finally, as long as x′ ≥ x′k, that is, the highest-k-bids-win auction is mixed in with  prob-
ability into x, we observe via Fact 3.5 that supq:x′k(q)≥1 x
′(q)/x′k(q) ≤ supq x′(q) ≤ n, and
obtain an error bound of 80 log(n/) n√
Nk
.
3.3 Derivation of error bounds
We will now give the main ideas behind the proof Theorem 3.2. This analysis is non-trivial because
the estimator, which is a weighted order statistic, is based on weights with magnitudes that can
be exponentially large. Importantly Zk(q) = (1 − q)y′(q)/x′(q) and, while the numerator y′(q) is
bounded by Fact 3.5 by n (the number of agents), the denominator can be exponentially small.
Thus, both Zk(q) and its derivative Z
′
k(q) can be exponentially big, specifically N
cn for absolute
constant c ∈ (0, 1) (see Example 1, below). The revenue estimator is a weighted order statistic
with weights proportional to Z ′k and thus straightforward analyses will not give good bounds on
the error. We begin with one such analysis that gives an error bound that is linear in the maximum
of Zk(q) and modify it to reduce the dependence on this term to be logarithmic. For non-extremal
quantiles q, Zk(q) is bounded by N
n and thus logZk(q) is at most the n logN term that appears
in the error bound of Theorem 3.2.
Example 1. The allocation rules and derivatives for the k = 1 unit auction and the k = n−1 unit
auction are:
xn−1(q) = 1− (1− q)n−1; x′n−1(q) = (n− 1) (1− q)n−2.
x1(q) = q
n−1; x′1(q) = (n− 1)qn−2.
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Consider the estimator for the revenue of the (n−1)-unit auction from bids in the one-unit auction,
i.e., y = xn−1 and x = x1, at the lower extreme quantile q = log logN/N and with number of
samples N  n. We get Zk(q) = (1 − q)y′(q)/x′(q) = (1 − q)n−1 q2−n ≈ q2−n and Z ′k(q) ≈
(2 − n) q1−n; thus the magnitudes of both Zk(q) and Z ′k(q) at quantile q = log logN/N are on
the order of [N/(log logN)]n which is upper and lower bounded by N cn for appropriate absolute
constants c. Recall that terms from extreme quantiles below δN = O(log logN/N) are rounded
down to zero in the estimator; thus, this upper bound is tight for the subsequent analysis.
The remainder of this section sketches the main ideas in deriving the above logarithmic bound
on the error. The full proof of Theorem 3.2, as well as the more detailed analysis that gives
Theorem 3.3, is given in Appendix A. Assume that the counterfactual auction y is the highest-k-
bids-win auction for some k; denote the allocation rule of this auction by xk, and let Zk = Zxk .
We will prove Theorem 3.2 for this special case. Then, by virtue of the fact that Py is a weighted
average of the constituent Pk’s, the theorem trivially extends to all rank-based auctions y.
As in the statement of the theorem, let δN = max(25 log logN,n)/N , and let Λ = [0, δN ]∪ [1−
δN , 1] denote the set of extreme quantiles. Apply equation (10) and equation (11) from Theorem 3.1
to the true bid function and truncated empirical bid function to write the counterfactual revenue
and the estimated revenue, respectively, as:
Pk = Eq 6∈Λ
[−Z ′k(q) b(q)]+ Eq∈Λ[Zk(q) b′(q)]
+ Zk(1− δN )b(1− δN )− Zk(δN )b(δN ).
Pˆk = Eq 6∈Λ[−Z ′k(q) bˆ(q)] + Zk(1− δN )bˆN .
The mean absolute error is bounded by the expected value of the absolute value of the difference
in these two quantities:
|Pˆk − Pk| ≤ |Eq 6∈Λ[−Z ′k(q)(bˆ(q)− b(q))]|+
∣∣Eq∈Λ[Zk(q) b′(q)]∣∣ (13)
+ |Zk(1− δN ) (b(1− δN )− bˆN )|+ |Zk(δN ) b(δN )|
There are now two steps to the analysis. The first step is an analysis of the contribution to
the error from moderate quantiles, i.e., the first term in equation (13). We will sketch this step
below. The second step is analysis of the contribution to the error from extreme quantiles, i.e.,
the remaining terms in equation (13). In Appendix A we show that the error from these terms
is dominated by the error in the first term. As a summary of this deferred analysis, e.g., for
the final term Zk(δN ) b(δN ), the denominator of Zk(q) can be very small, but it is approximately
proportional to b(q) in the numerator and can be canceled. The other terms are similarly bounded.
The following straightforward analysis gives a bound on the error in the estimator from moderate
quantiles that is linear in supq 6∈Λ Zk(q). Specifically, the expected error is bounded as
|Eq 6∈Λ[Z ′k(q) (bˆ(q)− b(q))]| ≤ Eq 6∈Λ
[|Z ′k(q)|] · supq 6∈Λ |bˆ(q)− b(q)|.
For the second term in this expression, Lemma 2.2 provides a uniform bound on the absolute error
in bids |bˆ(q)−b(q)|. For the first term, the following lemma shows that Zk is single-peaked and, thus,
Eq 6∈Λ[|Z ′k(q)|] ≤ 2 supq 6∈Λ Zk(q). The proof of this lemma, which is formally given in Appendix A,
follows from the fact that x is a convex combination of multi-unit auctions and that the ratio of
the derivatives of the allocation rules of two multi-unit auctions is single-peaked.
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Lemma 3.6. For any rank-based auction and k-highest-bids-win auction with allocation rules x and
xk, respectively, the function Zk(q) = (1− q)x
′
k(q)
x′(q) achieves a single local maximum for q ∈ [0, 1].
As described in Example 1, supq 6∈Λ Zk(q) can be very large. In order to obtain a better bound,
we observe that the error in bids is large precisely at quantiles where Zk is small and vice versa:
Zk depends inversely on the slope of the allocation rule of the incumbent auction, x
′, whereas, the
error in bids is directly proportional to the bid density b′, which in turn is proportional to x′. We
utilize this observation as follows:
∣∣∣Eq 6∈Λ[Z ′k(q) (bˆ(q)− b(q))]∣∣∣ ≤ Eq 6∈Λ[∣∣∣∣Z ′k(q)Zk(q)
∣∣∣∣ ∣∣∣Zk(q) (bˆ(q)− b(q))∣∣∣] (14)
≤ Eq 6∈Λ
[∣∣∣∣Z ′k(q)Zk(q)
∣∣∣∣] sup
q
∣∣∣Zk(q) (bˆ(q)− b(q))∣∣∣ .
As the integral of Z ′k(q)/Zk(q) is logZk(q), this analysis and the single-peaked-ness of Zk(q)
gives an error bound that is logarithmic instead of linear in supq 6∈Λ Zk(q). The following lemma,
formally proved in Appendix A, summarizes the bound on the error from moderate quantiles.
Lemma 3.7. For Zk and Λ defined as above, the first error term in equation (13) of the estimator
Pˆk is bounded by:
Ebˆ
[∣∣∣Eq 6∈Λ[Z ′k(q) (bˆ(q)− b(q))]∣∣∣] ≤ 8n logN√
N
sup
q 6∈Λ
{x′k(q)}
This lemma combines with analyses of the contribution to the error of extremal quantiles to
give Theorem 3.2. The refined bound of Theorem 3.2 comes from improved factoring of the error
term over that of equation 14 in Lemma 3.7.
4 Simulation evidence
This section presents evidence from simulations that support, extend, and improve on our theoret-
ical results. Of interest are
• the dependence of the error bound on the number of samples N and the number of bidders
in each auction n,
• the dependence of the error bound on the similarity between the incumbent and counterfactual
auctions, and
• the role of truncation, i.e., the dropping of the extremal quantiles of the empirical bid distri-
bution in the estimator.
While we have not given theoretical bounds without truncation, our simulations show that the error
of the estimator without truncation is small when the counterfactual and incumbent mechanism
are similar.
Our first simulation study look at the performance of the estimator without truncation when
the number of samples N is relatively small and the incumbent and counterfactual auction are
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similar. The goal of this study is to empirically evaluate the dependence of the non-truncated
estimator’s error on n, N , and the auctions’ similarity (to be defined as ) and compare this error
to the theoretical bounds given for the estimator with truncation.
In this simulation setup we infer the revenue of a position auction B using bid data from mixed
auction C = (1 − ) A + B where A is another position auction. This scenario comes from the
application to A/B testing which we develop subsequently in Section 5. Recall that xA denotes
the allocation rule of A, xB the allocation rule of B, and xC(q) = (1 − )xA(q) +  xB(q) is the
allocation rule of C. For this experiment, we consider the following three designs.
• Design 1: Auction A is the one-unit auction, xA(q) = qn−1; and auction B is the uniform-
stair position auction (defined below), xB(q) = q.
• Design 2: Auction A is the uniform-stair position auction, xA(q) = q; and Auction B is the
one-unit auction, xB(q) = q
n−1
• Design 3: Auction A is the (n − 1)-unit auction, xA(q) = 1 − (1 − q)n−1; and auction B is
the one-unit auction, xB(q) = q
n−1.
Definition 3. The uniform-stair position auction is given by position weights w with wk =
n−k
n−1
for each k ∈ [1, n] and has allocation rule x(q) = q.
Our second simulation study evaluates the role of truncation by comparing the error of the
estimator with and without truncation when the incumbent and counterfactual mechanism are not
similar.
In this simulation setup, the incumbent mechanism is the (n − 1)-unit auction with n players
(auction C) while the counterfactual mechanism is the one-unit auction (auction B). The object of
interest is the estimated revenue of auction B from the bids in auction C. Observe that Design 4 is
equivalent to Design 3 with  set to zero.
• Design 4: Auction B is the one-unit auction, xB(q) = qn−1; and auction C is the (n−1)-unit
auction, xC(q) = 1− (1− q)n−1.
Notice that the auctions of Design 4 are quite different. Specifically, auction C’s revenue is
driven by the bidders at the bottom of the support of the distribution of values while the revenue
of auction B is determined by the bidders at the top of the support. This dissimilarity between
the auctions results in the truncated terms in the estimator being high-variance. Thus, truncation
serves to lower the error of the estimator.
For all designs, the values of the bidders are drawn the beta distribution with parameters
α = β = 2. This distribution of values is supported on [0, 1]; it is unimodal with the mode and the
mean at 1/2 and it is symmetric about the mean.
Methodology
We perform simulations to calculate the mean absolute deviation of our estimator PˆB for the
revenue of auction B with the auction’s expected revenue PB. The allocation rules xB and xC , their
derivatives x′B and x
′
C , and the revenue curve R are calculated analytically. The expected revenue
PB is calculated from the revenue curve R and x
′
B by equation (2) via numerical integration (i.e.,
by averaging the values of R(q)x′B(q) on a grid). The equilibrium bids in auction C for values on a
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uniform grid are calculated from equation (6) via numerical integration on a grid. Each simulation
draws N bids from this set of bids with replacement, the estimated revenue PˆB is calculated from
Definition 2, and the mean absolute deviation is calculated by averaging |PB− PˆB| over 8000 Monte
Carlo simulations.
Results and observations
Theorem 3.4 provides a bound for the mean absolute deviation of the estimation for the revenues
of auction B. We can evaluate this bound individually for each design to obtain the bound of
80√
N
n log n for Designs 1-3.
We now study the performance of the estimator without truncation for the auction revenue
for Designs 1-3. The empirical bounds are compared to the theoretical bounds for the truncated
estimator. The justification for this study is as follows. First, when the auctions are similar
the truncated terms are not big, so truncating does not help lower error. Thus, we expect the
simulations to show similar error as our theoretical bounds for the truncated estimator. Second,
truncation is only valid when the number of samples is very large compared to the number of
bidders in each auction (typically, we need N ≥ 25n2); thus the truncated estimator cannot be
studied in the small N regime.
In Figure 1 we report our empirically observed mean absolute error in revenue for each of the
three designs; the auction mixture is set as  = .001 and parameters n and N are varied. In order
to discern the dependence of the error on N and n, the values in Figure 1 are normalized by the
factor
√
N . By replicating the Monte Carlo sampling we ensured that the Monte Carlo sample size
leads to the relative error of at most 6%.
We make the following observations that contrast the simulation results with the theoretical
bound of Corollary 3.4:
• Dependence on N : Per our theoretical bound and normalization, we expect the values
reported in the table to stay constant across different numbers of samples N if the estimator
were truncated.
• Dependence on n: Per our theoretical bound and normalization, we expect the values
reported in the table to be increasing with n (as n log n). The table shows an empirical
performance of the estimator that has much better dependence on n and indicates that it
may be possible to further improve the theoretical bound.
• Constants: The simulations suggest that constants in the theoretical bound are quite loose,
specifically, for the designs studied the theoretical bound is larger than one, i.e., trivial, until
N  106. In the simulations the estimator worked quite well even for N = 10.
One reason why the theoretical bound may be loose (both for constants and dependence on n) is
that the bounds were developed to be versitile enough to capture the extremal cases where the
incumbent and counterfactual mechanism are quite different. For applications like this simulation,
where the incumbent and conterfactual mechanism are related by a modest , the analysis of initial
steps in the bound could be simplified and improved.
We next illustrate the dependence of the estimation error on the choice of the mixture weight 
for the three considered designs. We fix the number of agents n = 32 and the sample size N = 1000
and vary the mixture probability  between 0 and 1, exclusive. In Figure 2 we demonstrate the
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Design 1: xA(q) = x
(1:n)(q) and xB(q) = q.
n = N =
101 102 103 104 105
21 0.1215 0.1150 0.1169 0.1177 0.1196
22 0.5631 0.4164 0.3830 0.3823 0.3961
23 1.1846 0.5820 0.5147 0.5350 0.5031
24 1.4014 0.4977 0.4374 0.4630 0.4285
25 1.4764 0.3908 0.3059 0.3082 0.2854
26 1.3843 0.2811 0.1962 0.2019 0.1918
27 2.5895 0.2691 0.1598 0.1503 0.1508
28 1.3640 0.2839 0.1374 0.1302 0.1335
29 0.5693 0.4647 0.1309 0.1153 0.1175
Design 2: xA(q) = q and xB(q) = x
(1:n)(q).
21 0.1215 0.1150 0.1169 0.1177 0.1196
22 0.0814 0.0605 0.0582 0.0596 0.0642
23 0.0779 0.0653 0.0652 0.0672 0.0661
24 0.0690 0.0621 0.0612 0.0646 0.0623
25 0.0566 0.0522 0.0494 0.0508 0.0487
26 0.0425 0.0358 0.0355 0.0356 0.0349
27 0.0230 0.0281 0.0241 0.0248 0.0253
28 0.0117 0.0204 0.0171 0.0171 0.0186
29 0.0060 0.0158 0.0120 0.0118 0.0178
Design 3: xA(q) = x
(n−1:n)(q); xB(q) = x(1:n)(q).
21 0.1215 0.1150 0.1169 0.1177 0.1196
22 0.2391 0.2257 0.2289 0.2262 0.2322
23 0.2162 0.1138 0.1090 0.1074 0.1100
24 0.1155 0.1061 0.1067 0.1118 0.1136
25 0.0870 0.0853 0.0842 0.0878 0.0887
26 0.0571 0.0636 0.0637 0.0665 0.0672
27 0.0370 0.0486 0.0458 0.0490 0.0546
28 0.0210 0.0340 0.0348 0.0370 0.0431
29 0.0097 0.0253 0.0257 0.0271 0.0371
Figure 1: Mean absolute deviation for PˆB across Monte-Carlo simulations normalized by
√
N .
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Figure 2: Dependence of the relative median absolute error from the mixture weight as log(1/).
The x-axis displays values of  on a log scale, and the y-axis plots error on a linear scale.
dependence of the median absolute error computed as the ratio of the median absolute error to
estimated revenue as a function of log 1/. In Designs 1 and 3, the dependence on log 1/ at
moderate values of  is linear as expected by the theoretical bound, and is sublinear at very small
values or very large values of  showing that the theoretical bound is weak at those values. Design
2 displays a different trend: as  decreases, the error decreases at first and then flattens out.
Intuitively, because the bid distribution that auction A in Design 2 generates has high density on
its entire range, this auction is much better for inferring the revenue of B than B itself. Therefore,
as the weight 1−  of A in C increases, our inference of B’s revenue improves until it hits a plateau
at  ≈ 0.1.
Finally, we consider the challenge case of Design 4 where the data from the (n−1)-unit auction
C is used to infer the revenue of the one-unit auction B. This inference is especially challenging as
n grows because the bids of the (n− 1)-auction are pushed down due to the competition between
bidders with the lowest values. At the same time, the revenue from the 1-unit auction is driven by
competition between bidders with the highest values. Specifically, the term supq(x
′
B(q)/x
′
C(q)) in
the theoretical bound diverges at extreme quantiles, and the truncation of the estimator plays an
active role in controling the error.
Figure 3 exhibits this behavior: for n ≥ 4, the error from the non-truncated estimator is orders
of magnitude larger than the error from the truncated estimator, and indeed larger than the bound
given by Theorem 3.2. The truncated estimator, on the other hand, exhibits stable behavior with
respect to both the sample size and the number of bidders, and its error is well below the theoretical
bound given by Theorem 3.2.
Also shown in Figure 3, the non-truncated estimator performs well when n = 2 and n = 3.
When n = 2, the auctions B and C are one and the same. The n = 3 case is interesting and
the result of a general observation: when the counterfactual auction is a k-unit auction and the
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Design 4: xB(q) = x
(1:n)(q) and xC(q) = x
(n−1:n)(q).
Estimator with truncation
n = N =
105 4 · 106 5 · 106 6 · 106 7 · 106 8 · 106
2 0.00020 0.00014 0.00015 0.00013 0.00013 0.00014
3 0.00012 0.00005 0.00005 0.00005 0.00005 0.00005
4 0.00011 0.00014 0.00009 0.00017 0.00043 0.00019
5 0.00019 0.00009 0.00011 0.00008 0.00010 0.00014
10 0.00009 0.00007 0.00008 0.00010 0.00005 0.00004
Estimator without truncation
2 0.00012 0.00014 0.00015 0.00013 0.00013 0.00014
3 0.00005 0.00005 0.00005 0.00005 0.00005 0.00005
4 2.38256 4.82498 7.47×101 1.67×102 2.82×102 3.53 ×102
5 2.95732 3.99×107 6.31×107 9.16×107 1.25×108 2.02×108
10 3.20×101 3.48×1010 4.99×1010 3.27×1010 2.09×1010 3.95×1010
Figure 3: The ratio of the mean absolute error of the revenue estimator in Monte Carlo simulations
to the theoretical bound of Theorem 3.2, i.e., 16n2 log N/
√
N . Ratios below one are consistent
with the theoretical bound, ratios above one are inconsistent.
incumbent auction is a (k+ 1)-unit auction, the function Z(q) turns out to be linear in q, meaning
that Z ′(q) is constant, and the non-truncated estimator is a simple average of the observed bids
(scaled appropriately). In this case, the non-truncated estimator is well-behaved and exhibits small
error.
5 Applications to A/B testing
We now discuss applications of the inference approach we developed in Section 3 to the problem of
A/B testing of auctions.
5.1 Estimating revenues of novel mechanisms
Consider the setup described in the introduction where an auction house running auction A would
like to determine the revenue of a novel mechanism B. The typical approach for doing so is to run
the auction B with some probability  > 0 and A with the remaining probability. Ideally, if in
doing so, the auction house obtains N bids in response to the auction B out of a total of N bids,
the revenue of B can be estimated within an error bound of
Θ
(
1√

)
supq{x′B(q)}√
N
(15)
where xB denotes the allocation rule corresponding to B. We refer to this approach as ideal A/B
testing.
In practice, however, instead of obtaining bids in equilibrium for auction B, the analyst obtains
bids in equilibrium for the aggregate mechanism C = (1−)A+B. We can then use Definition 2 to
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estimate the revenue of B. As a consequence of Corollary 3.4, and noting that x′B(q)/x
′
C(q) ≤ 1/
for all quantiles q, we obtain the following error bound.
Corollary 5.1. The revenue of a rank based mechanism B can be estimated from N bids of a
rank-based mechanism C = (1− )A+ B with absolute error bounded by
80n log(n/)√
N
. (16)
Relative to the ideal situation described above, our error bound has a better dependence on 
and a worse dependence on n. Note that when  is very small, our error bound of equation (16)
may be smaller than the ideal bound of equation (15). In fact, we obtain a non-trivial bound on
the error even when  = 0, per Theorem 3.2:
Corollary 5.2. The revenue of a rank based mechanism B can be estimated from N bids of any
rank-based mechanism C with absolute error bounded by
16n2 logN√
N
. (17)
This is not surprising: the ideal bound ignores information that we can learn about the revenue
of B from the (1− )N bids obtained when B is not run.
When B is a multi-unit auction, we obtain a slightly better error bound using Theorem 3.3
which is closer to the ideal bound of equation (15).
Corollary 5.3. The revenue of the highest-k-bids-win mechanism B can be estimated from N bids
of a rank-based mechanism C = (1− )A+ B with absolute error bounded by
80 supq{x′B(q)} log(n/)√
N
. (18)
5.2 Comparing revenues
We have considered the case where the empirical task was to recover the revenues for one mechanism
(y) using the sample of bids responding to another mechanism (x). In many practical situations the
empirical task is simply the verification of whether the revenue from a given mechanism is higher
than the revenue from another mechanism. Or, equivalently, the task could be to verify whether
one mechanism provides revenue which is a certain percentage above that of another mechanism.
We now demonstrate that this is a much easier empirical task in terms of accuracy than the task
of inferring the revenue.
Suppose that we want to compare the revenues of mechanisms B1 and B2 by mixing them in
to an incumbent mechanism A, and running the composite mechanism C = B1 + B2 + (1− 2)A.
Specifically, we would like to determine whether PB1 > αPB2 for some α > 0. Consider a binary
classifier γˆ which is equal to 1 when PB1 > αPB2 and 0 otherwise. Let γ = 1{PB1 − αPB2 > 0} be
the corresponding “ideal” classifier for the case where the distribution of bids from mechanism C
is known precisely. To evaluate the accuracy of the classifier, we need to evaluate the probability
Pr[γˆ = 1|γ = 0], and likewise, Pr[γˆ = 0|γ = 1]. The classifier will give the wrong output if the
sampling noise in estimating PˆB1 − α PˆB2 is greater than |PB1 − αPB2 |.
Our main result of this section says that fixing the number of positions n, α, and the difference
|PB1 − αPB2 |, with the number of samples from the bid distribution, N , being large enough, the
probability of incorrect output decreases exponentially with N .
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Theorem 5.4. For arbitrary n-agent rank-based auctions A, B1, and B2 and N bids from the
equilibrium bid distribution of mechanism C = B1 + B2 + (1− 2)A, the estimator for the binary
classifier γ = 1{PB1 − αPB2 > 0}, that establishes whether the revenue of mechanism B1 exceeds
α times the revenue of mechanism B2, has error rate bounded by
exp
(
−O
(
Na2
α2n3 log(n/)
))
,
where a = |PB1 − αPB2 |, as long as N  n/a.
We obtain a similar error bound when our goal is to estimate which of r different novel mecha-
nisms obtains the most revenue, for any r > 1:
Corollary 5.5. Suppose that our goal is to determine which of r rank-based auctions, B1, B2, · · · , Br,
obtains the most revenue while running incumbent mechanism A, by running each of the novel mech-
anisms with probability /r. Then the error probability of the corresponding classifier constructed
using N bids from composite mechanism C =
∑r
i=1 /rBi + (1− )A is bounded from above by
r exp
(
−O
(
Na2
n3 log(rn/)
))
,
where a is the absolute difference between the revenue obtained by the best two of the r mechanisms.
6 Applications to instrumented optimization
In this section we consider the problem of the principal who would like a mechanism that optimizes
revenue for the current distribution of agent values while simultaneously enabling the inference
necessary to reoptimize the mechanism in the future, should the distribution of values change.
Recall, the optimal auctions of the classical theory pool agents with distinct values and are thus
not well suited to counterfactual inference. In Section 6.1 we develop a theory for optimizing
revenue over the class of all rank-based auctions that resembles Myerson’s theory for optimal
auction design. Importantly, the optimal rank-based auction does not require knowledge of the
full distribution, instead the multi-unit revenues (P1, . . . , Pn) are sufficient; moreover, the previous
developments of this paper enable the estimation of these multi-unit revenues. Where Myerson’s
theory employs ironing by value and value reserves, our approach analogously employs ironing by
rank and rank reserves. In Section 6.2 we extend the A/B-testing approach of Section 3 to develop a
“universal B test mechanism” that can be used to estimate all of the multi-unit revenues (P1, . . . , Pn)
simultaneously. Combined with the optimal rank-based mechanism A, the A/B-test mechanism
with this universal B test is simultaneously good for revenue and counterfactual inference. In
Section 6.3 we take a more principled approach to optimization subject to inference, and solve
for the revenue-optimal mechanism subject to the constraint that all multi-unit revenues can be
estimated. Finally, in Section 6.4 we show that the revenue of an optimal rank-based auction
approximates the revenue of the optimal auction of Myerson (1981).
We begin by reviewing position environments and rank-based auctions. In a rank-based auction
the allocation to an agent depends solely on the ordinal rank of his bid among other agents’ bids,
and not on the cardinal value of the bid. For a position environment, a rank-based auction assigns
agents (potentially randomly) to positions based on their ranks. Consider a position environment
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given by non-increasing weights w = (w1, . . . , wn). For notational convenience, define wn+1 = 0.
Define the cumulative position weights W = (W1, . . . ,Wn) as Wk =
∑k
j=1wj , and W0 = 0. We
can view the cumulative weights as defining a piece-wise linear, monotone, concave function given
by connecting the point set (0,W0), . . . , (n,Wn).
Multi-unit highest-bids-win auctions form a basis for position auctions. Consider the marginal
position weights w′ = (w′1, . . . , w′n) defined by w′k = wk − wk+1. The allocation rule induced
by the position auction with weights w is identical to the allocation rule induced by the convex
combination of multi-unit auctions where the k-unit auction is run with probability w′k.
A randomized assignment of agents to positions based on their ranks induces an expected
weight to which agents of each rank are assigned, e.g., w¯k for the kth ranked agent. These expected
weights can be interpreted as a position auction environment themselves with weights w¯. As for
the original weights, we can define the cumulative position weights W¯ as W¯k =
∑k
j=1wj . The
following lemma, which can be found in Devanur et al. (2013), characterizes the position weights
w¯ that can be induced by any rank-based auction in a position environment w.
Lemma 6.1 (e.g., Devanur et al., 2013). There is a rank-based auction with induced position
weights w¯ for position environment with weights w if and only if their cumulative weights satisfy
W¯k ≤Wk for all k, denoted W¯ ≤W .
Any feasible weights w¯ can be constructed from w by a (random) sequence of the following two
operations (cf. Hardy et al. (1929), and proof in Appendix E).
rank reserve For a given rank k, all agents with ranks between k + 1 and n are rejected. The
resulting weights w¯ are equal to w except w¯k′ = 0 for k
′ > k.
iron by rank Given ranks k′ < k′′, the ironing-by-rank operation corresponds to, when agents
are ranked, assigning the agents ranked in an interval {k′, . . . , k′′} uniformly at random to
these same positions. The ironed position weights w¯ are equal to w except the weights on
the ironed interval of positions are averaged. The cumulative ironed position weights W¯ are
equal to W (viewed as a concave function) except that a straight line connects (k′−1, W¯k′−1)
to (k′′, W¯k′′). Notice that concavity of W (as a function) and this perspective of the ironing
procedure as replacing an interval with a line segment connecting the endpoints of the interval
implies that W¯ ≤W coordinate-wise, i.e., W¯k ≤Wk for all k.
6.1 Optimal rank-based auctions
In this section we describe how to optimize for expected revenue over the class of rank-based
auctions. Recall that rank-based auctions are linear combinations over k-unit auctions. The char-
acterization of Bayes-Nash equilibrium, cf. equation (2), shows that revenue is a linear function of
the allocation rule. Therefore, the revenue of a position auction can be calculated as the convex
combination of the revenue Pk from the k-highest-bids-win auction for k ∈ {0, . . . , n}. Note that
P0 = Pn = 0.
Given these multi-unit revenues, P = (P0, . . . , Pn), the problem of designing the optimal rank-
based auction is well defined: given a position environment with weights w, find the weights w¯ for
a rank-based auction with cummulative weights W¯ ≤W maximizing the sum ∑k(w¯k − w¯k+1)Pk.
This optimization problem is isomorphic to the theory of envy-free optimal pricing developed by
Devanur et al. (2015). We summarize this theory below; a complete derivation can be found in
Appendix D.
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Define the multi-unit revenue curve as the piece-wise linear function connecting the points
(0, P0), . . . , (n, Pn). This function may or may not be concave. Define the ironed multi-unit revenues
as P¯ = (P¯0, . . . , P¯n) according to the smallest concave function that upper bounds the multi-unit
revenue curve. Define the multi-unit marginal revenues, P ′ = (P ′1, . . . , P ′n) and P¯
′
= (P¯ ′1, . . . , P¯ ′n),
as the left slope of the multi-unit and ironed multi-unit revenue curves, respectively. I.e., P ′k =
Pk − Pk−1 and P¯ ′k = P¯k − P¯k−1. The proof of the following theorem is given in the appendix.
Theorem 6.2. Given a position environment with weights w, the revenue-optimal rank-based auc-
tion is defined by position weights w¯ that are equal to w, except ironed on the same intervals as P
is ironed to obtain P¯ , and set to 0 at positions k for which P¯ ′k is negative.
As is evident from this description of the optimal rank-based auction, the only quantities that
need to be ascertained to run this auction is the multi-unit revenue curve defined by P . Therefore,
an econometric analysis for optimizing rank-based auctions need not estimate the entire value
distribution; estimation of the multi-unit revenues is sufficient.
6.2 Universal B test
In Section 5.1 we discussed how to estimate the revenue of a single auction B from the bids of
the A/B test mechanism C. Corollary 5.2 shows that an A/B test is not necessary as long as
we have enough samples from the bid distribution: the revenue of B can be estimated from any
incumbent mechanism A directly. In fact, we can estimate the revenue of all rank-based mechanisms
simultaneously from the bids of a single mechanism A. However, the error in estimation depends
suboptimally on the number of samples, as log(N)/
√
N rather than 1/
√
N . A natural question is
whether it is possible to estimate all rank-based revenues simultaneously at an optimal error rate
from bids of a single incumbent auction. Precisely, we now consider the problem identifying a B test
mechanism for which the revenue of any position auction D can be estimated from the equilibrium
bids in the A/B test mechanism C. Since the revenue of D is given by the convex combination of
the multi-unit revenues Pk, it suffices to estimate all of these multi-unit revenues. What properties
should the auction B have in order to enable this estimation? (Equivalently, what properties should
C have?)
Definition 4. A universal B test mechanism satisfies; for any rank-based auctions A and D, any
 > 0, and auction C defined by xC = (1 − )xA + xB; the revenue PD can be estimated from
N equilibrium bids of C with the dependence of the mean absolute error on N and  bounded by
O(log(1/)/
√
N).
Since the revenue of D can be estimated from the revenue of all multi-unit auctions, Corollary 5.3
implies that it suffices to mix every multi-unit auction into C with some small probability. The
uniform-stair mechanism (Definition 3 in Section 4), with position weights wk =
n−k
n−1 for each k,
gives a mechanism B with such a mixture.
Corollary 6.3. The uniform-stair position auction is a universal B test mechanism with mean
absolute error bounded by 80n log(n/)/
√
N .
Next we observe that in fact we can get similar results by mixing in just a few of the multi-unit
auctions. In particular, in order to estimate Pk accurately, it suffices to mix in a multi-unit auction
with no more than k units, and another one with no less than k units. This gives us a more efficient
universal B test for simultaneously inferring all of the multi-unit revenues (see Corollary 6.5).
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Lemma 6.4. The revenue of the highest-k-bids-win mechanism B can be estimated from N bids
of a rank-based all-pay auction C = (1 − 2)A +B1 + B2 where A is an arbitrary rank-based
auction, and B1 and B2 are the highest-k1-bids-win and highest-k2-bids-win auctions respectively,
with k1 ≤ k ≤ k2. The absolute error of the estimator is bounded by
80√
N
(n+ log(1/)) sup
q
{x′k(q)}
Proof. We begin by noting that for any j and k with k ≤ j,
x′k(q)
x′j(q)
=
(
n−2
k−1
)(
n−2
j−1
) ( q
1− q
)j−k
.
When k ≤ j and q ≤ 1/2, this ratio is less than 2n. Likewise, when k ≥ j and q ≥ 1/2, the ratio
is less than 2n. Therefore, for any q, and C = (1 − 2)A + B1 + B2 where B1 and B2 are the
highest-k1-bids-win and highest-k2-bids-win auctions respectively, with k1 ≤ k ≤ k2, we have
sup
q
x′k(q)
x′C(q)
≤ 2
n

.
Next we note that supq x
′
C(q) ≤ n and, therefore, supq:x′k(q)≥1
x′C(q)
x′k(q)
≤ n. Putting these quantities
together with Theorem 3.3, we get that the absolute error in estimating Pk from bids drawn from
C is at most
Ebˆ
[
|Pˆk − Pk|
]
≤ 80√
N
sup
q
{x′k(q)} (n+ log 1/) .
Corollary 6.5. The rank-by-bid position auction with weights w1 = 1, wk = 1/2 for 1 < k <
n− 1, and wn = 0 is a universal B test mechanism with mean absolute error bounded by O(n(n+
log(1/))/
√
N).
6.3 Optimal rank-based auctions with strict monotonicity
Position auctions, by definition, have non-increasing position weights w. The ironing in the iron-by-
rank optimization of Section 6.1 converted the problem of optimizing multi-unit marginal revenue
subject to non-increasing position weight, to a simpler problem of optimizing multi-unit marginal
revenue without any constraints. In this section, we describe the optimization of rank-based auc-
tions (i.e., ones for which position weights can be shifted only downwards or discarded) subject
to strictly decreasing position weights. In particular, we can reinterpret the decreasing position
weights of the universal B test mechanism from subsection 6.2 as such a strictness requirement.
The optimal mechanism with this strictness requirement will satisfy the same inference guarantee
proven for the A/B test while improving its revenue.
As described by Lemma 6.1, position weights w¯ are feasible as a rank-based auction in the
position environment w if the cumulative position weights satisfy Wk ≥ W¯k for all k. Suppose
we would like to optimize w¯ for position weight w subject to the monotonicity constraint that
the difference in successive position weights is at least that of some other position weights  =
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(1, . . . , n). Formally, w¯
′
k = w¯k − w¯k+1 ≥ k − k+1 = ′k for all k. For example,  could be 
times the position weights of the universal B test mechanism of the preceding section. We call an
allocation rule satisfying these monotonicity constraints an -strictly-monotone allocation rule. As
non-trivial ironing by rank always results in consecutive positions with the same weight, i.e., w¯′k = 0
for some k, the optimal rank-based mechanism with strict monotonicity will require overlapping
ironed intervals.
To our knowledge, performance optimization subject to a strict monotonicity constraint has not
previously been considered in the literature. At a high level our approach is the following. We start
with w which induces the cumulative position weights W which constrain the resulting position
weights w¯ of any feasible rank-based auction via its cumulative W¯ . We view w¯ as the combination
of two position auctions. The first has weakly monotone weights y¯ = (y¯1, . . . , y¯n); the second has
strictly monotone weights  = (1, . . . , n); and the combination has weights w¯k = y¯k + k for all
k. The revenue of the combined position auction is the sum of the revenues of the two component
position auctions. Since the second auction has fixed position weights, its revenue is fixed. Since
the first position auction is weakly monotone and the second is strictly, the combined position
auction is strictly monotone and satisfies the constraint that w¯′k ≥ ′k for all k.
This construction focuses attention on optimization of y¯ subject to the induced constraint
imposed by w and after the removal of the -strictly-monotone allocation rule. I.e., w¯ must be
feasible for w. The suggested feasibility constraint for optimization of y¯ is given by position weights
y defined as yk = wk − k. Notice that, in this definition of y, a lesser amount is subtracted from
successive positions. Consequently, monotonicity of w does not imply monotonicity of y.
To obtain y¯ from y we may need to iron for two reasons, (a) to make y¯ monotone and (b)
to make the multi-unit revenue curve monotone. In fact, both of these ironings are good for
revenue. The ironing construction for monotonizing y constructs the concave hull of the cumulative
position weights Y . This concave hull is strictly higher than the curve given by Y (i.e., connecting
(0, Y0), . . . , (n, Yn)). Similarly the ironed multi-unit revenue curve given by P¯ is the concave hull
of the multi-unit revenue curve given by P . The correct order in which to apply these ironing
procedures is to first (a) iron the position weights y to make it monotone, and second (b) iron
the multi-unit revenue curve P to make it concave. This order is important as the revenue of the
position auction with weights y¯ is only given by the ironed revenue curve P¯ when the y¯′ = 0 on
the ironed intervals of P¯ .
Theorem 6.6. The optimal -strictly-monotone rank-based auction for position weights w has
position weights w¯ constructed by
1. defining y by yk = wk − k for all k,
2. averaging position weights of y on intervals where y should be ironed to be monotone,
3. averaging the resulting position weights on intervals where P should be ironed to be concave
to get y¯, and
4. setting w¯ as w¯k = y¯k + k;
and is feasible for w if  is feasible for w.
Proof. The proof of this theorem follows directly by the construction and its correctness.
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As described previously, the rank-based auction given by w¯ in position environment given by
w can be implemented by a sequence of iron-by-rank and rank-reserve operations. Such a sequence
of operations can be found, e.g., via an approach of Alaei et al. (2012) or Hardy et al. (1929).
The following proposition shows that this optimal -strictly-monotone mechanism inherits the
inference properties of the mechanism with position weights , in particular, the A/B testing results
of Corollaries 5.1, 5.3, 6.3, and 6.5.
Proposition 6.7. For position weights  defined as  times the position weights of a B test mech-
anism, if position weights  are feasible for w then the optimal -strictly-monotone rank-based
auction for position weights w has the same inference guarantee as the A/B test with  probability
of B.
6.4 Approximation via rank-based auctions
In this section we show that the revenue of optimal rank-based auction approximates the optimal
revenue (over all auctions) for position environments. Instead of making this comparison directly
we will instead identify a simple non-optimal rank-based auction that approximates the optimal
auction. Of course the optimal rank-based auction of Theorem 6.2 has revenue at least that of this
simple rank-based auction, thus its revenue also satisfies the same approximation bound.
Our approach is as follows. Just as arbitrary rank-based mechanisms can be written as convex
combinations over k-highest-bids-win auctions, the optimal auction can be written as a convex
combination over optimal k-unit auctions. We begin by showing that the revenue of optimal k-unit
auctions can be approximated by multi-unit highest-bids-win auctions when the agents’ values are
distributed according to a regular distribution (Lemma 6.8, below). In the irregular case, on the
other hand, rank-based auctions cannot compete against arbitrary optimal auctions. For example,
if the agents’ value distribution contains a very high value with probability o(1/n), then an optimal
auction may exploit that high value by setting a reserve price equal to that value; on the other hand,
a rank-based mechanism cannot distinguish very well between values correspond to quantiles above
1 − 1/n. We show that rank-based mechanisms can approximate the revenue of any mechanism
that does not iron or reserve price within the quantile interval [1 − 1/n, 1] (but may arbitrarily
optimize over the remaining quantiles). Theorem 6.10 presents the precise statement.
Lemma 6.8. For regular k-unit n-agent environments, there exists a k′ ≤k such that the highest-
bid-wins auction that restricts supply to k′ units (i.e., a rank reserve) obtains at least half the
revenue of the optimal auction.
Proof. This lemma follows easily from a result of Bulow and Klemperer (1996) that states that
for agents with values drawn i.i.d. from a regular distribution the revenue of the k′-unit n-agent
highest-bid-wins auction is at least the revenue of the k′-unit (n − k′)-agent optimal auction. To
apply this theorem to our setting, let us use OPT(k, n) to denote the revenue of an optimal k-unit
n-agent auction, and recall that nPk is the revenue of a k-unit n-agent highest-bids-win auction.
When k ≤ n/2, we pick k′ = k. Then,
nPk ≥ OPT(k, n− k) ≥ (n− k)
n
OPT(k, n) ≥ 1
2
OPT(k, n),
and we obtain the lemma. Here the first inequality follows from Bulow and Klemperer’s theorem
and the third from the assumption that k ≤ n/2. The second inequality follows via by lower
28
bounding OPT(k, n − k) by the following auction which has revenue exactly (n−k)n OPT(k, n):
simulate the optimal k-unit n-agent on the n− k real agents and k fake agents with values drawn
independently from the distribution. Winners of the simulation that are real agents contribute to
revenue and the probability that an agent is real is (n− k)/n.
When k > n/2, we pick k′ = n/2. As before we have:
nPn/2 ≥ OPT(n/2, n/2) =
1
2
OPT(n, n) ≥ 1
2
OPT(k, n).
Lemma 6.9. For (possibly irregular) n-agent environments with revenue curve R(·) and quantile
q ≤ 1 − 1/n, there exists an integer k ≤ (1 − q)n such that the revenue of the k-highest-bids-win
auction is at least a quarter of nR(q), the revenue from posting a price of v(q).
Proof. First we get a lower bound on Pk for any k. For any value z, the total expected revenue of
the k-highest-bids-win auction is at least zk times the probability that at least k + 1 agents have
value at least z. The median of a binomial random variable corresponding to n Bernoulli trials
with success probability (k+1)/n is k+1. Thus, the probability that this binomial is at least k+1
is at least 1/2. Combining these observations by choosing z = v(1− (k + 1)/n) we have,
nPk ≥ v(1− (k + 1)/n) k/2.
Choosing k = b(1− q)nc − 1, for which v(1− (k + 1)/n) ≥ v(q), the bound simplifies to,
nPk ≥ v(q) k/2.
The ratio of Pk and R(q) = (1− q) v(q) is therefore at least
k
2(1− q)n >
k
2(k + 2)
.
For q ≤ 1− 3/n (or, k ≥ 2) this ratio is at least 1/4.
For q ∈ (1 − 3/n, 1 − 1/n], we pick k = 1. Then, P1 is at least 1/n times v(q) times the
probability that at least two agents have a value greater than or equal to v(q). We can verify for
n ≥ 2 that
P1 ≥ v(q)
n
(
1− qn − n(1− q)qn−1) ≥ 1
4
(1− q) v(q).
Theorem 6.10. For regular value distributions and position environments, the optimal rank-based
auction obtains at least half the revenue of the optimal auction. For any value distribution (possibly
irregular) and position environments, the optimal rank-based auction obtains at least a quarter of
the revenue of the optimal auction that does not iron or set a reserve price for the highest 1/n
measure of values i.e., q ∈ [1− 1/n, 1].
Proof. In the regular setting, the theorem follows from Lemma 6.8 by noting that the optimal
auction (that irons by value and uses a value reserve) in a position environment is a convex combi-
nation of optimal k-unit auctions: since the revenue of each of the latter can be approximated by
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that of a k′-unit highest-bids-win auction with k′ ≤ k, the revenue of the convex combination can
be approximated by that of the same convex combination over k′-unit highest-bids-win auctions;
the resulting convex combination over k′-unit auctions satisfies the same position constraint as the
optimal auction.
In the irregular setting, once again, any auction in a position environment is a convex combi-
nation of optimal k-unit auctions. The expected revenue of any k-unit auction is bounded from
above by the expected revenue of the optimal auction that sells at most k items in expectation.
The per-agent revenue of such an auction is bounded by R¯(1 − k/n), the revenue of the optimal
allocation rule with ex ante probability of sale k/n. Here R¯(·) is the ironed revenue curve (that
does not iron on quantiles in [1 − 1/n, 1]). R¯(1 − k/n) is the convex combination of at most two
points on the revenue curve R(a) and R(b), a ≤ 1−k/n ≤ b < 1−1/n. Now, we can use Lemma 6.9
to obtain an integer ka < n(1 − a) such that Pka is at least a quarter of R(a), likewise kb for b.
Taking the appropriate convex combination of these multi-unit auctions gives us a 4-approximation
to the optimal auction k-unit auction (that does not iron over the quantile interval [1 − 1/n, 1]).
Finally, the convex combination of the multi-unit auctions with ka and kb corresponds to a position
auction with that is feasible for a k unit auction (with respect to serving the top k positions with
probability one, service probability is only shifted to lower positions).
7 Inference for social welfare
We now consider the problem of estimating the social welfare of a rank-based auction using bids
from another rank-based all-pay auction. Consider a rank-based auction with induced position
weights w. By definition, the expected per-agent social welfare obtained by this auction is as
below, where Vk is the expected value of the kth highest value agent, or the kth order statistic of
the value distribution.
Sw =
1
n
n∑
k=1
wkVk.
We note that the value order statistics, Vk, are closely related to the expected revenues of the
multi-unit auctions. The k-unit second-price auction serves the top k agents with probability 1,
and charges each agent the k + 1th highest value. Its expected revenue is therefore nPk = kVk+1.
We therefore obtain:
Sw = w1
V1
n
+
n−1∑
k=1
wk+1
Pk
k
.
The methodology developed in the previous sections can be used to estimate the Pk’s in the
above expression. The first order statistic of the values, V1, cannot be directly estimated in this
manner. Notate the expected value of an agent as
V = Eq[v(q)] = 1
n
n∑
k=1
Vk.
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Therefore, we can calculate the social welfare of the position auction with weights w as
Sw = w1V −
n∑
k=2
(w1 − wk)Vk
n
= w1V −
n−1∑
k=1
(w1 − wk+1) Pk
k
. (19)
We now argue that V can be estimated at a good rate from the bids of another rank-based
all-pay auction. Let x denote the allocation rule of the auction that we run, and b denote the bid
distribution in BNE of this auction. Then we note that
V = Eq[v(q)] = Eq
[
b′(q)
x′(q)
]
= Eq
[−Z¯ ′(q)b(q)]
where Z¯(q) = 1/x′(q). We might now try to directly apply Theorems 3.2 or 3.3 to bound the error
in our estimate of V. This does not immediately work, as Lemma 3.6 fails to hold for Z¯. Instead, we
observe that since x′(q) is a degree n− 1 polynomial and has fewer than n local minima, therefore
Z¯ has fewer than n local maxima. We can therefore adapt the arguments for the aforementioned
theorems to obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 7.1. The mean absolute error in estimating the expected value V using N samples from
the bid distribution for an all-pay rank-based auction with allocation rule x is bounded as given by
the two expressions below. Here n is the number of positions in the position auction.
Ebˆ
[
|Vˆ − V|
]
≤ 8n
2 logN√
N
Ebˆ
[
|Vˆ − V|
]
≤ 40n√
N
max
{
1, log supq 6∈Λ x
′(q), log supq 6∈Λ
1
x′(q)
}
As an example application of Lemma 7.1, we adapt Corollary 6.3 to bound the error from
estimating the social welfare of any position auction using bids from another position auction that
is mixed with the uniform-stair auction. Recall that the uniform-stair auction is a universal B test.
Using the universal B test of Corollary 6.5 instead of the uniform-stair auction gives a slightly worse
error bound, because the slope of the allocation rule for that auction can be as small as N−O(n).
Other revenue estimation results can be similarly adapted to estimate social welfare.
Theorem 7.2. For any rank-based auction A; uniform-stair auction B with position weights wk =
n−k
n−1 for each k ∈ [1, n]; and all-pay rank-based auction C with xC = (1 − )xA + xB; the mean
absolute error for estimating the social welfare of any rank-based auction D from N samples from
the bid distribution of C is bounded by:
O
(
n√
N
+
n log n log(n/)√
N
)
= O
(
n log n log(n/)√
N
)
.
The theorem follows by combining Lemma 7.1 with equation (19) and Corollary 6.3. The first
term follows from Lemma 7.1 by noting that the uniform-stair auction satisfies x′(q) = 1 for all q.
The second term follows from the error bounds on Pk given by Corollary 6.3; The extra factor of
log n (relative to the statement of the corollary) arises from the fact that the total weight of the
multipliers for the terms in equation (19) can be as large as
∑n
k=1 1/k ≈ log n.
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A Proofs for Section 3
In this section we prove the results from Section 3 which analyze the error of the counterfactual rev-
enue estimator for both multi-unit and (more generally) rank-based auctions with all-pay payment
semantics.
Recall that for all-pay auctions with allocation rule x(q), the equilibrium bid function b(q)
satisfies b′(q) = v(q)x′(q). From N bids in a mechanism with allocation rule x we are estimating
the counterfactual revenue of a mechanism with allocation rule y. Recall that for an implicit
allocation rule x and another allocation rule y, we define the function Zy(q) = (1− q) y
′(q)
x′(q) . When
y is the allocation rule corresponding to a k-unit auction, we let Zk(q) denote Zxk(q). Our analysis
treats the contribution to the error from extreme quantiles q ∈ Λ = [0, δN ] ∪ [1 − δN , 1] for δN =
max(25 log logN,n)/N and moderate quantiles q 6∈ Λ separately. In equation (13), restated below,
the first term is the error from moderate quantiles and the latter three terms is the error from
extremal quantiles.
|Pˆk − Pk| ≤ |Eq 6∈Λ[−Z ′k(q)(bˆ(q)− b(q))]|+
∣∣Eq∈Λ[Zk(q) b′(q)]∣∣ (13)
+ |Zk(1− δN ) (b(1− δN )− bˆN )|+ |Zk(δN ) b(δN )|
The proofs in this appendix are organized as follows. The error in our estimator for the revenue
Pk of a k-unit auction from moderate quantiles is analyzed in Section A.1. Section A.2 proves
some basic properties of allocation rules and bid functions for rank-based auctions that will be
employed in Section A.3 where the error from extremal quantiles, specifically the three latter terms
of equation (13), are analyzed. The main results from Section 3.2, namely Theorems 3.2 and 3.3
and Corollary 3.4 are proven in Section A.4.
A.1 Bounding the error from moderate quantiles
We will now restate and prove Lemmas 3.6 and 3.7, bounding the contribution to the error of the
estimator from moderate quantiles, Eq 6∈Λ
[
|Z ′k(q)| |bˆ(q)− b(q)|
]
. The first lemma proves that Zk has
a single local maximum.
Lemma 3.6. For any rank-based auction and k-highest-bids-win auction with allocation rules x and
xk, respectively, the function Zk(q) = (1− q)x
′
k(q)
x′(q) achieves a single local maximum for q ∈ [0, 1].
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Proof. Consider the function A(q) = 1/Zk(q) = x
′(q)/(1− q)x′k(q). Recall that x′(q) is a weighted
sum over x′j(q) for j ∈ {1, · · · , n− 1}. Thus, A(q) is a weighted sum over terms x′j(q)/(1− q)x′k(q).
Let us look at these terms closely.
x′j(q)
(1− q)x′k(q)
= αk,jq
k−j(1− q)j−k−1
where coefficient αk,j is a constant. The functions q
k−j(1− q)j−k−1 are convex. This implies that
A(q) which is a weighted sum of convex functions is also convex. Consequently, it has a unique
minimum. Therefore, Zk(q) = 1/A(q) has a unique maximum.
The following lemma gives the basic analysis of the error from moderate quantiles. A key
aspect of this proof is that its dependence on supq 6∈Λ Zk(q) is logarithmic. Immediately following
this proof we give a more refined analysis that enables better bounds when estimating the revenue
of counterfactual mechanism y from bids in x when the allocation rules of x and y are related.
Lemma 3.7. For Zk and Λ defined as above, the first error term in equation (13) of the estimator
Pˆk is bounded by:
Ebˆ
[∣∣∣Eq 6∈Λ[Z ′k(q) (bˆ(q)− b(q))]∣∣∣] ≤ 8n logN√
N
sup
q
{x′k(q)}
Proof. Recall from Section 3.3 that we can write the error on the moderate quantiles as:∣∣∣Eq 6∈Λ[Z ′k(q) (bˆ(q)− b(q))]∣∣∣ ≤ Eq 6∈Λ[∣∣∣∣Z ′k(q)Zk(q)
∣∣∣∣] sup
q
∣∣∣Zk(q) (bˆ(q)− b(q))∣∣∣ . (14)
Using Lemma 3.6, the first term on the right in equation (14), Eq 6∈Λ
[∣∣∣Z′k(q)Zk(q) ∣∣∣], is bounded by
2(supq 6∈Λ logZk(q)− infq 6∈Λ logZk(q)).
We note that for q 6∈ Λ, and any rank-based allocation rule y, y′(q) ∈ (δnN , n]. Therefore,
Zk(q) ∈ [δnN/n, nδ−nN ] ∈ (N−n, Nn). Therefore, we have:
Eq 6∈Λ
[∣∣∣∣Z ′k(q)Zk(q)
∣∣∣∣] < 4 logNn = 4n logN.
To bound the second term on the right in equation (14), we write:
sup
q
∣∣∣Zk(q) (bˆ(q)− b(q))∣∣∣ ≤ sup
q
x′k(q) sup
q
∣∣∣∣ 1x′(q) (bˆ(q)− b(q))
∣∣∣∣
≤ sup
q
x′k(q) sup
q
∣∣∣∣ 1b′(q) (bˆ(q)− b(q))
∣∣∣∣ .
Invoking Lemma 2.2, the expected value of this term for random samples from the bid distribution
is bounded as:
Ebˆ
[
sup
q
∣∣∣Zk(q) (bˆ(q)− b(q))∣∣∣] ≤ sup
q
x′k(q)
1√
N
(
1 +
4n log logN√
N
)
.
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Putting the two bounds together, we get,
Ebˆ
[∣∣∣Eq 6∈Λ[Z ′k(q) (bˆ(q)− b(q))]∣∣∣] ≤ 4n logN√
N
sup
q
{x′k(q)}
(
1 +
4n log logN√
N
)
We may assume without loss of generality that 4n logN <
√
N , otherwise the first term, and
therefore the entire error bound, exceeds 1 and is trivially true. Under this assumption, the term
in brackets is no more than 2, and the lemma follows.
The following lemma gives a refinement of Lemma 3.7 that enables better bounds when esti-
mating the revenue of counterfactual mechanism y from bids in x when the allocation rules of x
and y are related.
Unfortunately, Eq 6∈Λ
[∣∣∣Z′k(q)Zk(q) ∣∣∣] can be quite large, as Zk(q) can take on exponentially large values
at extreme quantiles (see Example 1 in Section 3.3). The main idea in the refined analysis is a
better factoring in the error from moderate quantiles in equation (14). We instead factor this error
term as follows, for an appropriate function h(Zk) which is just slightly sublinear in Zk.∣∣∣Eq 6∈Λ[Z ′k(q) (bˆ(q)− b(q))]∣∣∣ ≤ Eq 6∈Λ[∣∣∣∣Z ′k(q)h(Zk)
∣∣∣∣] sup
q
∣∣∣h(Zk) (bˆ(q)− b(q))∣∣∣ .
This factoring gives greater control in balancing the error generated from the two terms. For
an appropriate choice of the function h(·), we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma A.1. For Zk and Λ defined as above, the first error term in equation (13) of the estimator
Pˆk is bounded by:
Ebˆ
[∣∣∣Eq 6∈Λ[Z ′k(q) (bˆ(q)− b(q))]∣∣∣]
≤ 40√
N
(
1 +
4n log logN√
N
)
sup
q
{x′k(q)} max
{
1, log sup
q:x′k(q)≥1
x′(q)
x′k(q)
, log sup
q
x′k(q)
x′(q)
}
.
Proof. For any α > 0 we can write
|Pˆk − Pk| ≤ E
[
(log(1 + Zk(q)))
α
Zk(q)
|Z ′k(q)|
]
sup
q
∣∣∣∣ Zk(q)(log(1 + Zk(q)))α (bˆ(q)− b(q))
∣∣∣∣ .
We start by considering the first term. Lemma 3.6 shows that Z ′k(·) changes sign only once.
Consider the region where the sign of Z ′k(·) is constant and make the change of variable t = Zk(q).
Denote Z∗k = supq Zk(q), and note that infq Zk(q) ≥ 0. The first term evaluates as
E
[
(log(1 + Zk(q)))
α
Zk(q)
|Z ′k(q)|
]
≤ 2
∫ Z∗k
0
(log (1 + t))α
t
dt.
Note that for any t > 0, log(1 + t) ≤ t. Thus,∫ δ
0
(log (1 + t))α
t
dt <
δα
α
.
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Now split the integral into two pieces as∫ Z∗k
0
(log (1 + t))α
t
dt =
∫ 1
0
(log (1 + t))α
t
dt+
∫ Z∗k
1
(log (1 + t))α
t
dt.
We just proved that the first piece is at most 1/α. Now we upper bound the second piece and
consider the integrand at t ≥ 1. First, note that
(log (1 + t))α =
(
log t+ log(1 +
1
t
)
)α
≤
(
log t+
1
t
)α
≤ (log t+ 1)α.
Thus, the integral behaves as∫ Z∗k
1
(log (1 + t))α
t
dt ≤
∫ Z∗k
1
(log (t) + 1)α
t
dt =
1
1 + α
(log Z∗k + 1)
1+α.
Thus, we just showed that
E
[
(log(1 + Zk(q)))
α
Zk(q)
|Z ′k(q)|
]
≤ 2
α
+
2
1 + α
(log Z∗k + 1)
1+α,
which is at most 2(1 + e)/α for α < 1/ log Z∗k .
Now consider the term
sup
q
∣∣∣∣ Zk(q)(log(1 + Zk(q)))α (bˆ(q)− b(q))
∣∣∣∣ .
Note that log(1 + t) ≥ min{1, t}/2. So the first term can be bounded from above as
Zk(q)
(log(1 + Zk(q)))
α ≤ 2α max
{
Zk(q), (Zk(q))
1−α} .
Thus using Lemma 2.2,
E
[
sup
q
∣∣∣∣ Zk(q)(log(1 + Zk(q)))α (bˆ(q)− b(q))
∣∣∣∣]
≤ sup
q
∣∣∣∣ Zk(q)(log(1 + Zk(q)))α b′(q)
∣∣∣∣E
[
sup
q
∣∣∣∣∣ bˆ(q)− b(q)b′(q)
∣∣∣∣∣
]
≤ 2α sup
q
(
max
{
x′k(q), (x
′
k(q))
1−α(x′(q))α
}) 1√
N
(
1 + 16
log logN√
N
sup
q
q(1− q)b′(q)
)
≤ 2α sup
q
(
x′k(q)
)
max
(
1, sup
q:x′k(q)≥1
x′(q)
x′k(q)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:A

α
1√
N
(
1 +
4n log logN√
N
)
.
where the last inequality follows by noting that b′(q) ≤ x′(q) ≤ n, and q(1− q) ≤ 1/4.
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Now we combine the two evaluations together and pick α = min{1, 1/ logA, 1/ logZ∗k}, with A
defined as above, to obtain
E
[
|Pˆk − Pk|
]
≤ 2(1 + e)
α
2αAα
1√
N
sup
q
(
x′k(q)
)
≤ 40√
N
sup
q
{x′k(q)} max
{
1, logA, log sup
q
{
x′k(q)
x′(q)
}}(
1 +
4n log logN√
N
)
.
A.2 Bounds for the allocation rules and bid distributions of rank-based auctions
In this section we prove some basic properties of allocation rules for rank-based auctions. These
properties will be useful, in Section A.3, for analizing the error of the estimator at extreme quantiles.
As desribed in Section 2, the allocation rule and its derivative for the n-agent k-unit auction are
xk(q) =
k−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
qn−i−1(1− q)i,
x′k(q) = (n− 1)
(
n− 2
k − 1
)
qn−k−1(1− q)k−1.
We will be interested in the behavior of allocation rule xk and its derivative x
′
k at the extremes,
specifically for q ∈ [0, 1/n] and q ∈ [1−1/n, 1]. The allocation rule is steepest at q = (k−1)/(n−2)
and is convex before this point and concave after it. Specifically, x1 is steepest at q = 1 and is
convex and xn−1 is steepest at q = 0 and is concave. For all other k ∈ {2, . . . , n−2}, the allocation
rule derivative x′k is maximized between 1/(n− 2) > 1/n and (n− 3)/(n− 2) < 1− 1/n.
The following two lemmas bound the derivative of the allocation of multi-unit auctions at
extreme quantiles. Combining them we obtain the subsequent theorem.
Lemma A.2. For k ∈ {2, n− 2} units and δ < 1/n, the allocation rule derivative x′k satisfies:
1. supq<δ x
′
k(q) = x
′
k(δ) and
2. supq>1−δ x′k(q) = x
′
k(1− δ).
Proof. This lemma follows from convexity of the allocation rule xk on [0, 1/n] and concavity on
[1− 1/n, 1].
Lemma A.3. For k ∈ {1, n− 1} units and δ < 1/n, the allocation rule derivative x′k satisfies:
1. supq<δ x
′
n−1(q) ≤ e x′n−1(δ) and
2. supq>1−δ x′1(q) ≤ e x′1(1− δ).
38
Proof. This lemma follows from the closed-from of the allocation rule derivatives as x′1(q) = (n −
1) qn−2 and x′n−1(q) = (n− 1) (1− q)n−2. Thus, x′1(1) = x′n−1(0) = n− 1 and
x′1(1− δ) = x′n−1(δ) = (n− 1) (1− δ)n−2
≥ 1
e
(n− 1)
=
1
e
x′1(1) =
1
e
x′n−1(0).
Concavity of xn−1 and convexity of x1, then, imply the result.
Theorem A.4. For any n-agent rank-based mechanism with allocation rule x and δ < 1/n, the
allocation rule derivative x′ satisfies:
1. supq<δ x
′(q) ≤ e x′(δ) and
2. supq>1−δ x′(q) ≤ e x′(1− δ).
The bid function b(·) can be bounded by the allocation rule x(·) and its derivative x′(·) via the
following lemma. The subsequent theorem follows from the lemma via Theorem A.4.
Lemma A.5. For any all-pay mechanism with allocation rule x and δ ∈ [0, 1], the equilibrium bid
function b satisfies
1. b′(δ) ≤ x′(δ),
2. b(δ) ≤ δ supq<δ x′(δ), and
3. b(1)− b(1− δ) ≤ δ supq>1−δ x′(δ).
Proof. The equilibrium bid function is defined by b′(q) = v(q)x′(q) and b(0) = 0 (where v(q) ∈ [0, 1]
is the value function). Part (1) follows from the upper bound v(q) ≤ 1. Parts (2) and (3) follow by
upper bounding x′(q) by its supremum on the interval of the integral and integrating the bound of
part (1). For example for part (2), b(δ) =
∫ δ
0 v(r)x
′(r) dr ≤ ∫ δ0 supq<δ x′(q) dr = δ supq≤δ x′(q).
Theorem A.6. For any n-agent all-pay rank-based mechanism with allocation rule x and δ < 1/n,
the equilibrium bid function b satisfies
1. b(δ) ≤ δ e x′(δ), and
2. b(1)− b(1− δ) ≤ δ e x′(1− δ).
A.3 Bounding the error at extreme quantiles
We now bound the remaining terms in equation (13). Once again these bounds rely on the observa-
tion that for any quantile q, Zk(q)b(q) is bounded, because Zk depends inversely on x
′(q), whereas
b(q) is roughly proportional to it.
Lemma A.7. For Zy and Λ as defined above, if δN ≤ 1/n, the second error term of the estimator
Pˆy is bounded as follows.
Eq∈Λ
[
Zy(q) b
′(q)
] ≤ e δN y′(δN ) + e δ2Ny′(1− δN ).
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Proof. Apply part (1) of Lemma A.5 and the definition of Zy(q) = (1− q) y′(q)/x′(q) to obtain the
following upper bound:
Eq∈Λ
[
Zy(q) b
′(q)
] ≤ Eq∈Λ[(1− q) y′(q)] .
For q < δN , bound this epectation by e δN y
′(δN ) from Theorem A.4. For q > 1 − δN , bound this
expectation by e δ2N y
′(1− δN ).
Note, we could alternatively obtain the bound δNn by using the fact that supq y
′(q) ≤ n
(Fact 3.5).
Lemma A.8. For Zy and Λ as defined above, if δN ≤ 1/n, the third error term of the estimator
Pˆy is bounded as follows.
Ebˆ[|Zy(1− δN )(b(1− δN )− bˆN )|] ≤ δNy′(1− δN ) (eδN + 8N ).
Proof. Let qˆ be the quantile of the highest of the N observed bids, i.e., b(qˆ) = bˆN .
Conditioned on qˆ > 1− δN , bid bˆN = b(qˆ) is upper bounded by b(1). Applying Theorem A.6 to
bound b(1)− b(1− δN ) gives conditional error bound of
Zy(1− δN )(b(1)− b(1− δN )) ≤ e δ2Ny′(1− δN ).
Now condition on qˆ < 1− δN . For this conditioning, Lemma A.5 shows that b(1− δN )− b(qˆ) ≤
x(1− δN )− x(qˆ). We will now bound Eqˆ[x(1− δN )− x(qˆ) | qˆ < 1− δN ] Pr[qˆ ≤ 1− δN ] which is at
most Eqˆ[1− x(qˆ)].
We first analize Eqˆ[1− x(qˆ)] in the case that x = xk is the allocation rule for the k-unit auction.
We have,
Eqˆ[1− x(qˆ)] =
∫ 1
0
(1− xk(q))NqN−1dq
= N
∫ 1
0
qN−1
(
i=n−1∑
i=k
(
n− 1
i
)
qn−1−i(1− q)i
)
dq
= N
i=n−1∑
i=k
(
n− 1
i
)∫ 1
0
qN+n−2−i(1− q)idq
= N
i=n−1∑
i=k
(
n− 1
i
)
(N + n− 2− i)!i!
(N + n− 1)!
=
N
N + n− 1
i=n−1∑
i=k
(
n−1
i
)(
N+n−2
i
)
≤ N
N + n− 1
i=n−1∑
i=k
( n
N
)i
≤ N
N + n− 1
( n
N
)k 1
1− n/N
≤ 2
( n
N
)k
,
where the last inequality uses N > 1.5n.
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Substituting this back, we get for x = xk:
Ebˆ[|Zy(1− δN )(b(1− δN )− bˆN )|]
≤ δN y
′(1− δN )
x′k(1− δN )
{
eδNx
′
k(1− δN ) + 2
( n
N
)k}
= eδ2Ny
′(1− δN ) + 2δNy′(1− δN )
{
1
(n− 1)(n−2k−1)(1− δN )n−1−kδk−1N
( n
N
)k}
≤ eδ2Ny′(1− δN ) +
2
N
(
n
n− 1
)
δNy
′(1− δN )
(
n
NδN
)k−1 1(
n−2
k−1
)
(1− δN )n−1−k
≤ eδ2Ny′(1− δN ) +
8
N
δNy
′(1− δN ).
Here the last inequality follows by noting that
(
n−2
k−1
) ≥ 1, (1−δN )n > 1/4, and using δN ≥ n/N ,
n
NδN
≤ 1.
Finally, since x is a linear combination of the xk’s, we have,
Ebˆ[|Zy(1− δN )(b(1− δN )− bˆN )|]
≤ δN y
′(1− δN )
x′(1− δN )
(
eδNx
′(1− δN ) + Ebˆ[|1− x(q)|]
)
≤ max
k
δN
y′(1− δN )
x′k(1− δN )
(
eδNx
′
k(1− δN ) + Ebˆ[|1− xk(q)|]
)
≤ eδ2Ny′(1− δN ) +
8
N
δNy
′(1− δN ).
Lemma A.9. For Zy and Λ as defined above, if δN ≤ 1/n, the fourth error term of the estimator
Pˆy is bounded as follows.
Zy(δN )b(δN ) ≤ e δN y′(δN ).
Proof. The lemma follows directly from the definition of Zy with the upper-bound on b(δN ) of
Theorem A.6.
A.4 Proofs of main theorems
This section gives the complete proofs for the main theorems of Section 3.2. These theorems follow
fairly directly from the previous lemmas.
Theorem 3.2. The mean absolute error in estimating the revenue of a rank-based auction with
allocation rule y using N samples from the bid distribution for an all-pay rank-based auction with
allocation rule x is bounded as below. Here n is the number of positions in the two auctions, and
Pˆy is the estimator in Definition 2 with δN set to max(25 log logN,n)/N .
Ebˆ
[
|Pˆy − Py|
]
≤ 16n
2 logN√
N
.
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Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 3.7, we may assume without loss of generality that 4n logN <
√
N ,
and indeed, 16n2 logN <
√
N . This implies δN < 1/n, and then Lemmas 3.7, A.7, A.8, and A.9
together imply that the error in Pk is bounded by:
Ebˆ
[
|Pˆk − Pk|
]
≤ 8n logN√
N
sup
q 6∈Λ
{x′k(q)}+ 2eδNx′k(δN ) + (2e+ 8)δ2Nx′k(1− δN )
Further, 16n2 logN <
√
N also implies that the second and third terms together are no larger than
the first. The theorem then follows by recalling that supq x
′
k(q) ≤ n.
We will now prove the improved error bounds of Theorem 3.3 and Corollary 3.4. Recall the
definition of Φx,y from equation 12 in Section 3.2.
Φx,y := sup
q
{y′(q)} max
{
1, log sup
q:y′(q)≥1
x′(q)
y′(q)
, log sup
q
y′(q)
x′(q)
}
. (12)
Theorem 3.3 follows from Lemma A.1 in much the same way as Theorem 3.2 does from
Lemma 3.7. We may assume, without loss of generality, that
√
N < 80, in which case the er-
rors from the extreme quantiles get absorbed into the error from the moderate quantiles.
Theorem 3.3. Let x and xk denote the allocation rules for any all-pay rank-based auction and the
k-highest-bids-win auction over n positions, respectively. Let Pˆk denote the estimator from Defini-
tion 2 for estimating the revenue Pk of the latter auction from N samples of the bid distribution
of the former, with δN set to max(25 log logN,n)/N . If δN ≤ 1/n, the mean absolute error of the
estimator Pˆk is bounded as follows.
Ebˆ
[
|Pˆk − Pk|
]
≤ 80√
N
Φx,xk .
We now generalize error bound to estimate the revenue Py of an arbitrary rank-based auction
with allocation rule y from the bids of another rank-based auction with allocation rule x.
Corollary 3.4. Let x and y denote the allocation rules for any two all-pay rank-based auctions
over n positions. Let Pˆy denote the estimator from Definition 2 for estimating the revenue of the
latter from N samples of the bid distribution of the former, with δN set to max(25 log logN,n)/N .
If δN ≤ 1/n, the mean absolute error of the estimator Pˆy is bounded as follows.
Ebˆ
[
|Pˆy − Py|
]
≤ 80√
N
n log supq n
y′(q)
x′(q)
.
Proof. Write y as a rank-based auction with weights w:
y =
∑
k
w′k xk, and, Py =
∑
k
w′k Pk.
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Accordingly, the error in Py is bounded by a weighted sum of the error in Pk which are bounded
by Theorem 3.3. The weighted sum of these errors is simplified by observing that x′k(q) ≤ y′(q)/w′k
for all k and q:
Ebˆ
[
|Pˆy − Py|
]
≤
∑
k
w′k Ebˆ
[
|Pˆk − Pk|
]
≤ 80√
N
∑
k
w′kΦx,xk
≤ 80√
N
∑
k
w′k sup
q
{x′k(q)}max
{
log n, log 1
w′k
+ log sup
q
y′(q)
x′(q)
}
.
We now simplify the terms one at a time. Recall that supq{x′k(q)} ≤ n for all k. The first
and third terms can therefore be simplified using
∑
k w
′
k ≤ 1. For the second term, we observe∑
k w
′
k log
1
w′k
≤ log n. We therefore have:
Ebˆ
[
|Pˆy − Py|
]
=
80√
N
n log sup
q
n
y′(q)
x′(q)
. (20)
B Proofs for Section 5
We will now prove Theorem 5.4, restated here for convenience.
Theorem 5.4. For arbitrary n-agent rank-based auctions A, B1, and B2 and N bids from the
equilibrium bid distribution of mechanism C = B1 + B2 + (1− 2)A, the estimator for the binary
classifier γ = 1{PB1 − αPB2 > 0}, that establishes whether the revenue of mechanism B1 exceeds
α times the revenue of mechanism B2, has error rate bounded by
exp
(
−O
(
Na2
α2n3 log(n/)
))
,
where a = |PB1 − αPB2 |, as long as N  n/a.
Whereas we bound the expected absolute error of our revenue estimator in Section 3, in this sec-
tion we will require a concentration result for the error. We state this concentration result below and
prove it in Section B.1. We focus on the main term in our error bound, Eq 6∈Λ
[
−Z ′y(q)(bˆ(q)− b(q))
]
.
We can split this error into two components, one corresponding to the bias in the estimated bid
function and the other corresponding to the deviation of the estimated bids from their mean:
∣∣∣Eq 6∈Λ[−Z ′y(q)(bˆ(q)− b(q))]∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣Eq 6∈Λ[Z ′y(q)(bˆ(q)− b˜(q))]∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣Eq 6∈Λ[Z ′y(q)(b˜(q)− b(q))]∣∣∣ . (21)
Here, b˜ is a step function that equals the expectation of the empirical bid function bˆ: b˜(q) = E
[
bˆ(q)
]
.
The bias of the estimator, i.e., the second term above, is small:
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Lemma B.1. With b˜ defined as above,∣∣∣Eq 6∈Λ[Z ′y(q)(b˜(q)− b(q))]∣∣∣ = O(1)N supq {x′(q)} supq
{
y′(q)
x′(q)
}
.
The deviation from the mean, i.e., the first term in equation (21), is concentrated.
Lemma B.2. Let ∆ = supq 6∈Λ |(b′(q))−1(bˆ(q)− b˜(q))|. Then for any a > 0,
Pr
[∣∣∣Eq 6∈Λ[Z ′y(q)(bˆ(q)− b˜(q))]∣∣∣ ≥ a ∣∣∣∆] ≤ exp(− a2n(80∆Φx,y)2
)
.
The proofs of Lemmas B.1 and B.2 are deferred to the next subsection. We are now ready to
prove Theorem 5.4.
Proof of Theorem 5.4. We need to bound the probability that the error in estimating PˆB1−αPˆB2
is greater than |PB1 − αPB2 |. This error can in turn be decomposed into the error in estimating
PB1 and that in estimating PB2 . Denote a = |PB1 − αPB2 | > 0. Then,
Pr
[
|(PˆB1 − α PˆB2)− (PB1 − αPB2)| > a
]
≤ Pr
[
|PˆB1 − PB1 | > a/2
]
+ Pr
[
|PˆB2 − PB2 | > a/2α
]
.
Let x denote the allocation rule of the mechanism C that we are running, and let b be the corre-
sponding bid function. Now, recall that for
∆ = sup
q
|(b′(q))−1(̂b(q)− b(q))| and
Φx,xB1 = supq
{x′B1(q)}max
1, log supq:x′B1 (q)≥1
x′(q)
x′B1(q)
, log sup
q
x′B1(q)
x′(q)

equations (13) and (21) bound the error in estimation as a sum of five terms. Of these, all but
the first term in equation (21) can be bounded by O(n/N) using Lemmas A.7, A.8, A.9, and B.1.
Then, Lemma B.2 implies that, conditioned on ∆,
Pr
[
|PˆB1 − PB1 | > a/2
]
≤ 2 exp
(
− 1
n(80 ∆ Φx,xB1 )
2
(a
2
−O
( n
N
))2)
.
Finally, Φx,y < n log(n/), and with high probability ∆ is at most a constant times 1/
√
N
(Lemma 2.2). Consequently, for N  n/a,
Pr
[
|PˆB1 − PB1 | > a/2
]
≤ exp
(
−O
(
Na2
n3 log(n/)
))
.
Likewise,
Pr
[
|PˆB2 − PB2 | > a/2α
]
≤ exp
(
−O
(
Na2
α2n3 log(n/)
))
.
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B.1 Concentration bound for the revenue estimator
Lemma B.1. With b˜ defined as above,∣∣∣Eq 6∈Λ[Z ′y(q)(b˜(q)− b(q))]∣∣∣ = O(1)N supq {x′(q)} supq
{
y′(q)
x′(q)
}
.
Proof. We can write the function b˜(i/N) as
b˜(i/N) =
N !
(i− 1)!(N − i)!
∫
G(t)i−1(1−G(t))N−ig(t)t dt
=
N !
(i− 1)!(N − i)!
∫
ti−1(1− t)N−ib(t) dt.
Note that
N !
(i− 1)!(N − i)! t
i−1(1− t)N−i
is the density of the beta distribution with parameters α = i and β = N−i+1. Denote this density
f(t;α, β). Then we can write
b˜(i/N) =
∫ 1
0
b(t)f(t;α, β) dt.
Now let q ∈ [i/N, (i+ 1)/N ], and consider an expansion of b(t) at q such that
b(t) = b(q) + b′(q)(t− q) +O((t− q)2).
Now we substitute this expansion into the formula for b˜(·) above to get
b˜(i/N) = b(q) + b′(q)
∫ 1
0
(t− q)f(t;α, β) dt+O(
∫ 1
0
(t− q)2f(t;α, β) dt).
The mean of the beta distribution is α/(α+ β) and the variance is αβ/((α+ β)2(α+ β+ 1)). This
means that
b˜
(
i
N
)
− b(q) = b′(q)
(
i
N + 1
− q
)
+O
(
1
N2
)
.
Thus
sup
q∈[i/N,(i+1)/N ]
∣∣∣b˜(i/N)− b(q)∣∣∣ ≤ sup
q
b′(q)
2
N
+O
(
1
N2
)
.
Therefore, the expectation |Pˆy −E[Pˆy]| is at most O(1)/N supq{x′(q)} supq Zy(q).
We now focus on the deviation of our estimator from its mean. In order to obtain a concentration
bound, we express the estimator as a sum over many independent terms.
To this end, we first identify the set of quantiles at which the function bˆ “crosses” the function
b˜ from below. This set is defined inductively. Define i0 = δNN . Then, inductively, let i` be the
smallest integer strictly greater than i`−1 such that
bˆ
(
i` − 1
N
)
≤ b˜
(
i` − 1
N
)
and bˆ
(
i`
N
)
> b˜
(
i`
N
)
.
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Let im−1 be the last integer so defined, and let im = (1 − δN )N . Let I denote the set of indices
{i0, . . . , im}. Let Ti,j denote the following integral:
Ti,j =
∫ q=j/N
q=i/N
Z ′y(q)(bˆ(q)− b˜(q)) dq
Then, our goal is to bound the quantity Ebˆ[|T0,N |] where T0,N can be written as the sum:
T0,N =
m−1∑
`=0
Ti`,i`+1 .
We now claim that conditioned on I and the maximum weighted bid error, this is a sum over
independent random variables.
Lemma B.3. Conditioned on the set of indices I and ∆ = supq 6∈Λ |(b′(q))−1(bˆ(q)− b˜(q))|, over the
randomness in the bid sample, the random variables Ti`,i`+1 are mutually independent.
Proof. Fix I and `, and note that the function b˜ is fixed (that is, it does not depend on the
empirical bid sample). Then, the sum Ti`,i`+1 depends only on the empirical bid values bˆ(q) for
quantiles in the interval [i`/N, i`+1/N). By the definition of I, we know that the smallest i` bids
in the sample are all smaller than b˜((i` − 1)/N) ≤ b˜(i`/N), and the largest N − i`+1 bids in the
sample are all larger than b˜(i`+1/N) ≥ b˜((i`+1− 1)/N). On the other hand, the empirical bids bˆ(q)
for q ∈ [i`/N, i`+1/N) lie within [b˜(i`/N), b˜((i`+1 − 1)/N)]. Therefore, conditioned on i` and i`+1,
the latter set of empirical bids is independent of the former set of empirical bids.
Since within each interval (i`, i`+1) the multiplier bˆ(q) − b˜(q) changes sign only once, we can
apply the approach of Section 3.3, to bound each individual Ti`,i`+1 by 40∆Φx,y. We then apply
Chernoff-Hoeffding bounds to obtain a bound on the proability that Ebˆ[|T0,N | | I,∆] exceeds some
value a > 0.
Lemma B.2. Let ∆ = supq 6∈Λ |(b′(q))−1(bˆ(q)− b˜(q))|. Then for any a > 0,
Pr
[∣∣∣Eq 6∈Λ[Z ′y(q)(bˆ(q)− b˜(q))]∣∣∣ ≥ a ∣∣∣∆] ≤ exp(− a2n(80∆Φx,y)2
)
.
Proof. We will use Chernoff-Hoeffding bounds to bound the expectation of T0,N over the bid sample,
conditioned on I and ∆. We first note that T0,N has mean zero because for any integer i ∈ [0, N ],
Esamples
[
bˆ(i/N)
]
= b˜(i/N).
Next we note that the Ti,j ’s are bounded random variables. Specifically, let Q be an interval of
quantiles over which the difference bˆ(q) − b˜(q) does not change sign. Then, following the proof of
Lemma A.1, we can bound
|TQ| =
∣∣∣∣∫
Q
Z ′y(q)(bˆ(q)− b˜(q)) dq
∣∣∣∣
≤ 40∆ sup
q
{y′(q)} max
{
1, log sup
q:y′(q)≥1
x′(q)
y′(q)
, log sup
q
y′(q)
x′(q)
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: Φx,y
.
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Likewise, over an interval Q where Z ′y does not change sign, we again get |TQ| ≤ 40∆Φx,y with Φx,y
defined as above. Moreover, for an interval Q over which Z ′y changes sign at most t times, we have∫
Q
|Z ′y(q)(bˆ(q)− b˜(q))|dq ≤ t · 40∆Φx,y.
Finally, noting that Zy is a weighted sum over the n functions Zk defined for the k-unit auctions,
and that by Lemma 3.6 each Zk has a unique maximum, we note that Z
′
y changes sign at most 2n
times.
We now apply Chernoff-Hoeffding bounds to bound the probability that the sum
∑`=m−1
`=0 Ti`,i`+1
exceeds some constant a. With τ` denoting the upper bound on |Ti`,i`+1 |, this probability is at most
exp
(
− a
2∑
` τ
2
`
)
.
By our observations above, for all `, τ` ≤ 80∆Φx,y, and
∑
` τ` ≤
∫ 1
0 |Z ′y(q)(bˆ(q) − b˜(q))|dq ≤
80n∆Φx,y. Therefore,
∑
` τ
2
` ≤ n(80∆Φx,y)2. Since the bound does not depend on I, we can
remove the conditioning on I.
C Inference methodology and error bounds for first-price auctions
In this section we define and analyze an estimator for counterfactual revenue the bids in first-
price auctions. Our approach will be to reduce this estimation problem to the all-pay estimation
problem that we solved previously. Recall that the all-pay estimator is a weighted order statistic of
the empirical all-pay bid function. Our first-price estimator will map the empirical first-price bid
function to an empirical all-pay bid function and then apply to it the all-pay estimator.
Recall that the Bayes-Nash equilibrium bid function of first-price auction and all-pay auction
are related by the payment identity. Specifically an all-pay bid is deterministically equal to the
expected payment of the payment identity, while in a first-price auction an agent only pays upon
winning. To facilitate comparison to previous results we notate the equilibrium bid function of
the all-pay auction as b and the equilibrium bid function of the first-price auction as c. Given the
allocation rule x, the payment identity requires b(q) = x(q) c(q). Consequently, an empirical all-pay
bid function can be defined from the empirical first-price bid function as bˆ(q) = x(q) cˆ(q). Note
that while in previous sections the empirical all-pay bid function is piece-wise constant (similarly
the empirical first-price bid function is piece-wise constant), this empirical all-pay bid function is
not piece-wise constant.
Partition the quantile range into extreme quantiles Λ = [0, δN ] ∪ [1 − δN , 1] and the moderate
quantiles [δN , 1 − δN ]. Recall that truncation trades off a (potentially diverging) variance of the
estimator suggested by Theorem 3.1 at the extreme quantiles with a bias that can be bounded.
Specifically, truncation replaces bids at low quantiles with zero and bids at high quantiles with the
upper bound bˆ(1) (which, in terms of the first-price bids, is x(1) cˆ(1)).
As in section 3, the estimator for counterfactual revenue plugs the truncated empirical bid
function into the counterfactual revenue equation 11 of Lemma 3.1. We obtain the following
estimator in terms of the empirical first-price bids:
Pˆy = Eq 6∈Λ
[−Z ′y(q)x(q) cˆ(q)]+ Zy(1− δN )x(1) cˆ(1).
This estimator is a weighted order statistic as formalized in the following definition.
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Definition 5. The estimator Pˆy (with truncation parameter δN ) for the revenue of an auction with
allocation rule y from N samples cˆ1 ≤ · · · ≤ cˆN from the equilibrium bid distribution of a first price
auction with allocation rule x is:
Pˆy =
∑N−δNN
i=δNN
Eq∈[i,i+1]/N
[−Z ′y(q)x(q)] cˆi + Zy(q)x(1) cˆN .
To obtain a bound on the mean absolute error of the estimator judiciously plug the identity
relating first-price and all-pay equilibrium bids into the error bound of equation (13) to get:
|Pˆk − Pk| ≤ |Eq 6∈Λ[−Z ′k(q)x(q) (cˆ(q)− c(q))]|+
∣∣Eq∈Λ[Zk(q) b′(q)]∣∣ (22)
+ |Zk(1− δN ) (b(1− δN )− x(1) cˆN )|+ |Zk(δN ) b(δN )|
It is clear that terms that depend only on the equilibrium bid functions and not the empirical
bid functions need no further analysis. Specifically Theorem A.7 and Theorem A.9 bound the
contribution to the error of the second and fourth terms of equation (22). It remains to bound the
contribution from the first and third terms. These bounds come from relatively minor adjustments
to the analogous bounds for all-pay auctions.
For the third term, we can adapt the analysis of Theorem A.8. Denote the quantile of bid cˆN
by qˆ, i.e., cˆN = c(qˆ). There are two parts of the analysis, the first part is for the case qˆ ≥ 1 − δN
and the second part is for the case qˆ ≤ 1− δN .
For the first part, the proof of Theorem A.8 upper bounds bˆN by b(1). We can do the same
for x(1) cˆN : x(1) c(qˆ) ≤ x(1)c(1) = b(1). The first inequality follows from the monotonicity of the
equilibrium bid function, i.e., cˆ(qˆ) ≤ cˆ(1) for qˆ ≤ 1. Thus, we can upper bound the error in the
case that qˆ ≥ 1 − δN by Zk(1− δN ) (b(1)− b(1− δN )) which was bounded already in the proof of
Theorem A.8.
For the second part, write
x(1) c(qˆ) = x(1) b(qˆ)/x(qˆ)
≥ x(qˆ) b(qˆ)/x(qˆ)
= b(qˆ),
where inequality follows from monotonicity of x. Thus, we can upper bound the error in the case
that qˆ ≤ 1− δN by Zk(1− δN ) (b(1− δN )− b(qˆ)) which was bounded already by Theorem A.8.
To analyze the first term in the error bound of equation (22), we begin with the following upper
bound:
|Eq 6∈Λ[−Z ′y(q)x(q)(cˆ(q)− c(q))]| ≤ Eq 6∈Λ
[∣∣∣∣ Z ′y(q)h(Zy(q))
∣∣∣∣] sup
q
|x(q)h(Zy(q))(cˆ(q)− c(q))|
≤ Eq 6∈Λ
[∣∣∣∣ Z ′y(q)h(Zy(q))
∣∣∣∣] sup
q
|h(Zy(q))(cˆ(q)− c(q))| .
We can then carry out an analysis identical to the proof of Theorem A.1 with an appropriate choice
of h(·). The only difference is in the application of Theorem 2.2. Whereas for all-pay auctions the
lemma bounds the weighted error in bids in terms of supq{q(1 − q)x′(q)} ≤ n/4, in the case of
first-price auctions, this term is replaced by supq{q(1− q)x′(q)/x(q)}, which is no more than n for
rank-based allocation rules. We obtain the following theorem.
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Theorem C.1. The expected absolute error in estimating the revenue of a position auction with
allocation rule y using N samples from the bid distribution for a first-pay position auction with
allocation rule x is bounded by both of the expressions below; Here n is the number of positions in
the two position auctions.
Ebˆ
[
|Pˆy − Py|
]
≤ 28n
2 logN√
N
,
Ebˆ
[
|Pˆy − Py|
]
≤ 80√
N
n log supq n
y′(q)
x′(q)
.
When y is the highest-k-bids-win allocation rule, the latter bound improves to:
Ebˆ
[
|Pˆk − Pk|
]
≤ 80√
N
Φx,xk
with Φx,xk as defined in equation (12).
Because the error bounds in Theorem C.1 are identical up to constant factors to those in
Theorems 3.2, 3.3 and Corollary 3.4, other results in Lemma 6.4, Corollaries 5.1, 5.3, 6.3, 6.5, and
Theorems 5.4 and 7.2 continue to hold when bids are drawn from a first-price auction.
D Finding the optimal iron by rank auction
Recall that iron by rank auctions are weighted sums of multi-unit auctions. Therefore, their revenue
can be expressed as a weighted sum over the revenues Pk of k-unit auctions. We consider a position
environment given by non-increasing weightsw = (w1, . . . , wn), with w0 = 0, w1 = 1, and wn+1 = 0.
Define the cumulative position weights W = (W1, . . . ,Wn) as Wk =
∑
j≤iwj .
Define the multi-unit revenue curve as the piece-wise constant function connecting the points
(0, P0, . . . , (n, Pn). This function may or may not be concave. Define the ironed multi-unit revenue
curve as P¯ = (P¯1, . . . , P¯n) the smallest concave function that upper bounds the multi-unit revenue
curve. Define the multi-unit marginal revenues as P ′ = P ′1, . . . , P ′n and P¯
′
= P¯ ′1, . . . , P¯ ′n as the left
slope of the multi-unit and ironed multi-unit revenue curves, respectively. I.e., P ′k = Pk−Pk−1 and
P¯ ′k = P¯k − P¯k−1.
We now see how the revenue of any position auction can be expressed in terms of the multi-unit
revenue curves and marginal revenues.
E[revenue] =
n∑
k=0
Pk w
′
k =
n∑
k=0
P ′k wk
≤
n∑
k=0
P¯k w
′
k =
n∑
k=0
P¯ ′k wk.
The first equality follows from viewing the position auction with weights w as a convex combina-
tion of multi-unit auctions (where its revenue is the convex combination of the multi-unit auction
revenues). The second and final inequality follow from rearranging the sum (an equivalent ma-
nipulation to integration by parts). The inequality follows from the fact that P¯ is defined as the
smallest concave function that upper bounds P and, therefore, satisfies P¯k ≥ Pk for all k. Of course
the inequality is an equality if and only if w′k = 0 for every k such that P¯
′
k > P
′
k.
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We now characterize the optimal ironing-by-rank position auction. Given a position auction
weights w we would like the ironing-by-rank which produces w¯ (with cumulative weights satisfying
W ≥ W¯ ) with optimal revenue. By the above discussion, revenue is accounted for by marginal
revenues, and upper bounded by ironed marginal revenues. If we optimize for ironed marginal
revenues and the condition for equality holds then this is the optimal revenue. Notice that ironed
revenues are concave in k, so ironed marginal revenues are monotone (weakly) decreasing in k.
The position weights are also monotone (weakly) decreasing. The assignment between ranks and
positions that optimizes ironed marginal revenue is greedy with positions corresponding to ranks
with negative ironed marginal revenue discarded. Tentatively assign the kth rank agent to slot
k (discarding agents that correspond to discarded positions). This assignment indeed maximizes
ironed marginal revenue for the given position weights but may not satisfy the condition for equality
of revenue with ironed marginal revenue. To meet this condition with equality we can randomly
permute (a.k.a., iron by rank) the positions that corresponds to intervals where the revenue curve
is ironed. This does not change the surplus of ironed marginal revenue as the ironed marginal
revenues on this interval are the same, and the resulting position weights w¯ satisfy the condition
for equality of revenue and ironed marginal revenue.
E Constructing a position auction with a target vector of position
weights
In this section we show that in any position auction environment given by position weights w,
we can construct a rank based auction with induced position weights w¯ satisfying W¯ ≤W . The
allocation rule of the auction is constructed as a (random) sequence of iron by rank and rank reserve
operations.
Lemma E.1. In any position auction environment with position weights w and target weights w¯
satisfying W¯ ≤W , there exists a (random) sequence of iron by rank and rank reserve operations
following which the induced position weights are exactly w¯.
Proof. Suppose that we have W¯ ≤ W . We will describe how to assign agents to slots so as to
obtain position weights w¯. Let y denote the position weights corresponding to an intermediate
assignment. We begin by assigning the agent with the ith largest bid to the ith slot for all i ∈ [n].
The position weights for this assignment are given by y = w. We will then construct a series of
transformations or reassignments of agents to positions, each time making a small change to the
weights y, so as to bring them closer to the target w¯. Each transformation is either an rank-based
ironing operation or a rank reserve.
Let i denote the largest index such that W¯k = Yk for all k ≤ i. We will now present a
(randomized) tranformation that will increase the value of i. Specifically, we will reassign some
agents to positions in a manner such that the resulting position weights y˜ satisfy: W¯k = Y˜k for
k ≤ i+ 1 and Yk ≥ Y˜k ≥ W¯k for k > i+ 1.
Consider the operation of ironing by rank over the interval {i, . . . , i′} for some index i′ > i.
Recall that this operation averages out the position weights over this interval, setting each such
weight equal to (Yi′ − Yi)/(i′ − i), while leaving all other position weights intact. It also preserves
cumulative weights at positions k ≤ i and positions k ≥ i′. Note also that the larger that i′ is, the
smaller is the average weight (Yi′ − Yi)/(i′ − i). In particular, for any i′ > i + 1, this operation
strictly decreases the i+ 1th position weight.
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Suppose that there exists an index i′, with i + 1 < i′ < n, such that (Yi′ − Yi)/(i′ − i) ≥ w¯i+1
and (Yi′+1−Yi)/(i′+1− i) < w¯i+1. Let A := (Yi′−Yi)/(i′− i) and B := (Yi′+1−Yi)/(i′+1− i). Let
α ∈ (0, 1] be defined such that αA+ (1− α)B = w¯i+1. Now consider the following transformation.
With probability α, we iron over the rank interval {i, . . . , i′} and with probability 1 − α, we iron
over the rank interval {i, . . . , i′+1}. Let y˜ and Y˜ denote the new positions weights and cumulative
position weights at the end of the (randomized) ironing operation. Note that both of these ironing
operations preserve the position weights over positions k ≤ i and k > i′ + 1. Over positions
k ∈ {i, . . . , i′}, the new position weight y˜k is exactly αA+ (1− α)B = w¯i+1. Finally, both ironing
operations maintain the same cumulative weight at position i′ + 1. Since Y˜i′ = Yi′ = W¯i′ and
Y˜i′+1 = Yi′+1 > W¯i′+1, we get that the new position weight at i
′ + 1 is at least w¯i′+1. This
completes one step of our transformation.
Alternately, suppose that for i′ = n, we have (Yi′−Yi)/(i′−i) ≥ w¯i+1. Let A := (Yi′−Yi)/(i′−i)
and let α ∈ [0, 1] be defined such that αA = w¯i+1. Now consider the following transformation. With
probability α, we iron over the rank interval {i, . . . , n} and with probability 1 − α, we set a rank
reserve of i, that is, we reject every agent with rank > i. Note that both of these operations
preserve the position weights over positions k ≤ i. For k > i, the new position weights are exactly
αA = w¯i+1. Therefore, once again, we obtain W¯k = Y˜k for k ≤ i + 1 and Yk ≥ Y˜k ≥ W¯k for
k > i+ 1.
To summarize, we described a sequence of randomized operations. Each step of the sequence
increases the number of positions over which the position weights corresponding to our current
assignment, y, match the target position weights, w¯. After at most n such operations we obtain a
randomized assignment of agents to positions achieving the target position weights.
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